

---

## Treball Fi de Màster

*Supporting self-recovery in post-conflict situations: insights from Syria*

*Taylor Raeburn-Gibson*

---



Aquest TFG està subject a la licència [Reconeixement-  
NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional \(CC BY-NC-  
ND 4.0\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Este TFG está sujeto a la licencia [Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 4.0  
Internacional \(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

This TFG is licensed under the [Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International \(CC  
BY-NC-ND 4.0\)](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

MASTER THESIS

**SUPPORTING SELF-RECOVERY  
IN POST-CONFLICT  
SITUATIONS: Insights from Syria**

2019/2020 Academic Year

**Student:** Taylor RAEBURN-GIBSON

**Master of International Cooperation in Sustainable Emergency  
Architecture**

**Supervisor:** Pere VALL

**Date presented:** 08/06/2020

## **Acknowledgements**

I would like to express my sincerest thanks to everyone who supported this research project. Specifically, I would like to firstly thank all the participants in the study who gave me their time and wealth of knowledge which was the backbone of this project. Secondly, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Pere Vall for his guidance and assistance throughout the entire project. Next, I would like to thank Tom Corsellis from the Shelter Centre for his support early on in this project which was crucial in framing this research and gaining initial contacts. I would also like to thank Fares Al Saleh from SARD for his continued assistance and willingness to share his organization's experience. Finally, thank you to the Promoting Safer Building Working Group for allowing me to participate in their self-recovery working group which allowed me to better understand the current international efforts regarding self-recovery support.

## **Abstract**

Self-recovery shelter support is a modality of humanitarian aid which remains ill-defined and misunderstood despite the many aid organizations that attempt to undertake this work. Of the existing knowledge and best practices regarding self-recovery support methods, most has been developed from natural disaster situations and when considering post-conflict scenarios, self-recovery support methods are even more complex and under-researched. This study seeks to bring clarity to self-recovery support in post-conflict situations by identifying factors influencing the self-recovery support process. The study also seeks to identify ways to enhance self-recovery support for actors involved by reinforcing facilitators and mitigating barriers. These objectives are met through a combination of a literature review and a case study analysis of self-recovery support methods currently being employed in Syria. The results of this study include a framework which identifies and categorizes common factors, barriers, and facilitators which influence the implementation of self-recovery support projects. The results also include a list of recommendations to improve these projects for stakeholders involved. Based on an analysis of these recommendations, five key areas for action are discussed which are: 1) maximizing implementing organizations' capacities, 2) contextualizing risks, 3) increasing adaptable and flexible programming, 4) addressing the social dimension, and 5) improving international coordination.

**Keywords:** Self-recovery, Post-conflict, Housing, Reconstruction, Shelter, Humanitarian Aid

## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements.....	2
Abstract .....	3
Table of Contents .....	4
List of Tables .....	6
List of Figures .....	6
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .....	7
Chapter 1: Introduction .....	8
Chapter 2: Background.....	11
2.1 Precedence and Terminology.....	11
2.2. Pros and Cons of Supporting Self-Recovery .....	13
2.3 Supporting Self-Recovery in Post-Conflict Situations .....	16
2.4 Research Objective .....	18
Chapter 3: Methodology.....	19
3.1 Research Strategy.....	19
3.2 Secondary Research – Literature Review.....	20
3.3 Primary Research.....	20
3.3.1 Data Collection .....	20
3.3.2 Participant Selection .....	20
3.3.3 Semi-structured Interviews.....	23
3.3.4 Electronic Questionnaires .....	23
3.3.5 Participation Observation .....	23
3.4 Data Analysis .....	24
Chapter 4: Case Study - Syria .....	26
4.1 Introduction to the Syrian Conflict.....	26
4.2 Current Housing Reconstruction Situation in Northwest Syria .....	27
4.3 Self-Recovery Support in Syria.....	28
4.3.1 Participants’ Self-Recovery Programs.....	30
Chapter 5: Results .....	31
5.1 Literature Framework .....	31
5.2 Integrated Framework .....	33
5.3 Recommendations Table.....	35
Chapter 6: Discussion of Key Areas for Action.....	38
6.1 Maximizing Implementing Organizations’ Capacities .....	38
6.2 Contextualizing Risks .....	40
6.3 Increasing Adaptable and Flexible Programming.....	43
6.4 Addressing the Social Dimension .....	45

6.5 Improving International Coordination .....	47
Chapter 7: Conclusion .....	51
References .....	53
Annex A: Interview Guide .....	56
Annex B: Questionnaires .....	58
Annex C: Participants' Self-Recovery Program Information .....	67
Annex D: Literature Framework .....	70
Annex E: Integrated Framework .....	76
Annex F: Recommendations Table .....	85
Annex G: Stakeholder Analysis.....	101

## List of Tables

Table 1	Research Participants	21
Table 2	List of Participants in Promoting Safer Building Working Group April Workshop	24
Table 3	Classification of Levels of Supporting Self-recovery	29
Table 4	Simplified Literature Framework	31-32
Table 5	Simplified Integrated Framework	33-34
Table 6	Simplified Recommendations Table	36-37

## List of Figures

Figure 1	Theory of change for supporting shelter self-recovery	13
Figure 2	Considerations for shelter initiatives after natural disasters and conflicts	16
Figure 3	Research methodology strategy schematic	19
Figure 4	Distribution of participants by type of organization	22
Figure 5	Distribution of participants by area of operations	22
Figure 6	Map of Syrian civil war actors	27
Figure 7	Completed shelter rehabilitation in Syria	30
Figure 8	Percentage of organizations supporting each of the three-prongs of SSSR	30

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HLP	Housing, Land, and Property
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEC	Information, Education, and Communication
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
NFI	Non-food Item
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Rec	Recommendation
SARD	Syrian Association for Relief and Development
SR	Self-recovery
SSSR	Support for Shelter Self-recovery / Supporting Self-recovery
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene



## Chapter 1: Introduction

Housing is a crucial part of any post-emergency reconstruction and recovery effort. Without adequate housing, families cannot secure a job, raise their family, maintain security and privacy, construct social networks, or have a foundation for investing in their future (Ashdown, 2011; Association, 2018; Maynard, Parker, & Twigg, 2017; Turner & Fichter, 1972). Unfortunately, in most post-emergency situations, there is little permanent housing support from humanitarian aid organizations which results in most houses being re-built by families using their own resources (Ashdown, 2011; Davis, 1978). It has been estimated that housing recovery support programs only reach up to 30% of those affected (Parrack, Flinn, & Passey, 2014). In the case of the 2010 Haiti earthquake, for instance, only 10.4% of long-term housing needs were met by aid organizations (Parrack et al., 2014). This is not an uncommon reality and can be seen in most post-emergency situations (Barakat, 2005).

One potential method to address this lack of permanent housing is by supporting a *self-recovery* process whereby implementing organizations provide various forms of assistance to enable households to rebuild or repair their homes themselves or using local skills and techniques. Self-recovery, also called *self-help*, is not a new concept and was identified by Ian Davis (1978) as he revealed the prevalence of self-recovery reconstruction among communities following disasters in Peru. Davis also identified the importance of aid organizations supporting this process rather than replacing it. This concept remains relevant today, as Parrack et al. (2014) notes that self-recovery is still the way in which the majority of disaster-affected households repair or rebuild their dwellings (p. 47). Although humanitarian organizations are increasingly claiming to support self-recovery methods, it remains an under-researched and misunderstood method of support (Twigg et al., 2017).

Supporting self-recovery is not a simple process for aid organizations. It involves more than just selecting a design, hiring a contractor, and constructing a house; it requires taking into consideration vernacular architecture, understanding local building regulations, engaging with social networks and communities, enabling locals' skills and capabilities, implementing unique financing systems, taking account of gender considerations, and consulting technical expertise (Corsellis & Vitale, 2005; Maynard et al., 2017). It also demands buy-in from other stakeholders including local authorities, aid-coordinating bodies, the private sector, donors, community leaders and groups, and, most importantly, the homeowners themselves. The complexities involved in this type of support necessitate a strong and capable organization with robust manpower, funding, technical knowledge, and permanence (Davis, 2015). The

difficulties of these projects are also enhanced by a lack of experience as best practices “[remain] poorly understood” (Schofield & Flinn, 2018, p. 29). Although self-recovery approaches are increasing being used, these layers of complexity are one reason that they have not been adopted at an even greater scale.

Another reason that self-recovery approaches may not be as widely adopted is simply the lack of research into these programs (Maynard et al., 2017, pp. 9–10). Many of the benefits associated with self-recovery projects are social in nature and are in the form of increased livelihoods, perceptions of safety and security, stability and the ability to invest in the future, and physical and mental health (Barakat, 2003; Maynard et al., 2017, p. 62). Social benefits are not easy to quantify, and thus, not easy to measure. Without the proper case studies to help understand these complex processes and identify the benefits and limitations of self-recovery programs, the humanitarian sector will remain hesitant to fully commit to these approaches which require a large investments of expertise, time, and finances.

These complexities are only magnified when considering self-recovery methods in post-conflict situations. Whereas in post-natural disaster situations the threat has come and gone, and the population is then generally united in its recovery, post-conflict situations are more ambiguous and include added issues of persisting violence and re-emerging conflicts, mistrust among the local inhabitants, and much blurrier transitions between emergency and recovery (Barakat, 2003; Corsellis & Vitale, 2005; Humanitarian Coalition, 2015). Additionally, there is an even greater lack of research into self-recovery methods in post-conflict situations since most of the current existing theory has been developed out of natural disasters (Flinn, Schofield, & Morel, 2017; Schofield & Flinn, 2018).

These added layers of complexity decrease the likelihood of aid organizations supporting meaningful self-recovery programs as they will, rather, look to traditional modalities of emergency and transitional shelter support. In this way, they will likely repeat their common past failures in post-conflict housing approaches by continuing to focus on project-driven and short-sighted programs which have proven to repeatedly fail at providing flexible and adaptable solutions for local communities (Barakat, 2005, pp. 157–158). Self-recovery methods, which are inherently more longer-term, more adaptable to local communities, and less indicator-driven, are perhaps a good, yet challenging, direction for aid organizations to be moving (Hendriks, Basso, Sposini, van Ewijk, & Jurkowska, 2016; Maynard et al., 2017).

This research will seek to bring clarity to the complex process of self-recovery reconstruction specifically in post-conflict situations. This is hoped to assist aid organizations in clearly understanding the factors involved in a successful self-recovery

program and to contribute to the body of knowledge surrounding self-recovery approaches so that all stakeholders involved in this process can be well-informed. To accomplish this, the research will combine a literature review of self-recovery and post-conflict reconstruction theory with primary data collection from Syria, a case study which is both current and very relevant. The literature review will allow to identify the major factors involved in supporting self-recovery and to group them in levels, thus forming a framework. The case study will add a further layer of knowledge to the framework through the confirmation of factors previously identified and the inclusion of new factors. Based on the understanding of influencing factors from a holistic approach, recommendations and key areas for action will be identified to improve the self-recovery process for NGOs, donors, and academics.

## Chapter 2: Background

### 2.1 Precedence and Terminology

The current knowledge of self-recovery methods of reconstruction can be traced back to the work of John F.C. Turner in the 1950s and 1960s. Turner pioneered the concept of housing being a verb and not just a noun which meant that housing is also an activity, and not just a physical structure, which involves many economic, social, and psychological factors. Turner advocated for adopting a housing model by which the users, and not the state, are the principle actors and where the users must have the choice of their own housing. This does not mean that they must, necessarily, construct themselves, but that their decisions should govern the construction process and that they should have the right of managing that property thereafter in any way they choose (Turner, 1976; Turner & Fichter, 1972).

This concept was further carried forward by other scholars such as Ian Davis with his concept of housing being a process not a product. Davis (1978) explained how after disasters, the first principle must be to enable grass-roots reconstruction by survivors and avoid having foreign aid organizations do any actions that could be undertaken by survivors themselves (p. 12). Davis reinforced the idea that supporting self-recovery, which he called self-help at that time, is of utmost importance when responding to disasters and highlighted the need to find ways to balance the amount of external aid. Hamdi (1995) also emphasized the importance of participation and enablement and that organizations must support rather than provide. Based on these early scholars with vast amounts of field experience, self-recovery stands out as not only an inevitable process, but as a crucial component of the reconstruction process that must be understood and supported by aid organizations.

Since Turner, Davis, and Hamdi, many self-recovery programs have emerged within the aid sector. Aid organizations have used various terminology when describing this process including self-help and owner-driven reconstruction but more recently, self-recovery is the term that is being widely used (Newby, 2018). All these terms, however, relate back to the same concept (Newby, 2018). According to CARE International, self-recovery is a more recent term which seems to be a hopeful re-branding of owner-driven reconstruction, which, as a concept, had previously failed to genuinely give control over decision making to homeowners (Newby, 2018). Another term also used regularly is *supporting shelter self-recovery*, or simply *supporting self-recovery*, which refers specifically to the support that aid organizations can provide to enable self-recovery (Maynard et al., 2017; Newby, 2018; Parrack et al., 2014). To align with the

current terminology of the aid sector and scholars, this paper uses the terms self-recovery and supporting self-recovery.

One sole definition of self-recovery has yet to be agreed upon by the aid community (Twigg et al., 2017). This paper will abide by the following definition for self-recovery which has been found cited in many articles and studies: “[the process when] households rebuild or repair damaged or destroyed homes using their own assets... [which] can be savings, materials (salvaged, donated or owned), social and community assets, local skills and labour” (Parrack et al., 2014, p. 2). One important aspect of this definition is that it includes local labour within the scope meaning that not just homeowners who do the work themselves, but homeowners who contract out this work locally are also considered as self-recovering as long as they have agency over the construction.

This definition does not specifically mention aid organizations since the self-recovery process is not necessarily dependent on external support; self-recovery happens naturally, begins almost immediately after the emergency occurs, and is conducted with or without additional aid (Davis, 2015). This also means that self-recovery does not abide by the traditional emergency and recovery phases of post-disaster response. Because of this differentiation, aid organizations often describe their projects not as self-recovery projects but as supporting self-recovery, whereby they are supporting an inevitable process that is already occurring (Maynard et al., 2017). According to existing uses across various aid organizations, the following definition for supporting self-recovery was proposed by Maynard et al. (2017) and will be used for this research:

Humanitarian interventions supporting shelter self-recovery: provide one or a combination of material, financial and technical assistance; during the relief and/or recovery phase; to enable affected households to repair, build or rebuild their own shelters themselves or through using the local building industry. Material assistance includes the provision of construction materials, tools and support for salvaging and reuse of debris. Financial assistance includes the provision of cash or vouchers. Technical assistance can include (but is not limited to) the provision of guidance on construction through training, guidelines or mass communications (p. 61).

Newby (2018) points out; however, that these existing definitions do not focus enough on the agency of the homeowners, which is the essence the self-recovery concept, as Turner pointed out back in 1972. Newby proposes that, alongside these definitions, organizations remember that self-recovery is most importantly “recovery with agency” (para. 13).

The theory of change behind supporting self-recovery is visualized as follows:




Figure 1. Theory of change for humanitarian interventions supporting shelter self-recovery from *The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Interventions Supporting Shelter Self-Recovery Following Humanitarian Crises: an Evidence Synthesis* (p. 8), by V. Maynard et al., 2017, Oxford: Humanitarian Evidence Programme.

Figure 1 highlights what has become known as the *three-prong approach* of material, financial, and technical assistance which are the main inputs that organizations provide to homeowners in support (Schofield & Flinn, 2018). This theory of change also shows how self-recovery support aims for more social and longer-term outcomes and impacts which is an important difference to traditional shelter interventions.

## 2.2. Pros and Cons of Supporting Self-Recovery

There are many benefits to supporting self-recovery but also some disadvantages which organizations must be aware of. The foundational benefit of supporting self-recovery was initially noted by Davis (1978) through case studies between 1963 and 1978. These case studies showed that in developing nations, homeowners were often highly skilled in construction and had the ability to rebuild themselves (Davis, 1978). Davis also showed that aid organizations generally overlooked this capacity and that these homeowner skills were an underutilized resource which, if supported properly, could reduce the external labour required and increase the capacity of recovery efforts.

Another benefit is the cost-effectiveness of supporting self-recovery since, not only do these programs require less external labour, they require less imported materials, and less highly technical solutions. In the Balkans, for instance, self-recovery approaches were widely adopted between 1993-2000 and these projects proved to be 40% cheaper than contractor-built ones (Barakat, 2003; International Rescue Committee, 2020). Recently, this cost-effectiveness has resulted in self-recovery gaining in relevance globally due to the growing lack of humanitarian funding. The

global funding gap for humanitarian needs is now over four times what it was just one decade ago and in 2019, 39% of the need went unfunded (OCHA, 2020a; Skretteberg, 2019). Clearly, organizations must search for ways to maximize efficiencies and make their funding reach as many people as possible, and self-recovery methods are being looked at as a way of doing this.

Self-recovery projects can also open the door to initiatives which can promote building back safer and better. For instance, in Haiti, the organization *Build Change* supported self-recovery through engineering technical training which resulted in a vast increase in the quality of concrete blocks used in construction (Parrack et al., 2014). The reason these projects succeed is that they construct using vernacular architecture and construction techniques and supplement with technical expertise to improve safety. In this way, there is not a requirement for teaching complex new construction skills to the homeowners which increases the likelihood that these interventions will be accepted and adopted for future use by the community (Hendriks et al., 2016). Additionally, since homeowners have a vested interest in the construction, this increases the likelihood that the quality will be better than if built by contractors (Corsellis & Vitale, 2005, p. 194).

Self-recovery programs can also lead to significant positive social impacts. Maynard et al. (2017) notes that of 11 interventions supporting self-recovery that were studied, the majority showed that supporting self-recovery positively affects dignity, self-reliance and perceptions of safety, and security of the homeowners, among other benefits. Additionally, self-recovery enables the socio-economic stability of the population since these methods keep housing at an affordable price in the future (Davis, 2015, p. 105). The most important advantage, however, is that support to self-recovery empowers homeowners and gives them the decision-making authority over their construction thus leading to higher satisfaction levels among beneficiaries (Corsellis & Vitale, 2005; Opdyke, Javernick-Will, & Koschmann, 2019).

One main disadvantage of supporting self-recovery is the complexity of these projects in comparison to traditional modalities. Supporting self-recovery requires organizations which have technical and logistical skills, local experience, and the resources to manage this type of project. Additionally, the homeowners themselves must have the skills, time, equipment, and motivation necessary to complete this work, which is difficult due to the many other stressors, priorities, and vulnerabilities that homeowners face at times of crises (Corsellis & Vitale, 2005). In fact, in many cases, shelter has not been the main priority for communities following disasters as was seen in Haiti (Parrack et al., 2014, p. 57). This means that NGOs must adopt more complex intersectoral approaches which support homeowners in multiple ways throughout the

recovery process. Because of these complexities and requirements, most aid organizations tend to prefer emergency and traditional housing programs to self-recovery approaches (Davis, 2015, p. 11).

Another disadvantage is that in some cases, supporting self-recovery could actually result in families staying in emergency shelter (tents) for longer, since it skips the provision of transitional shelter (Parrack et al., 2014, p. 57). As Parrack et al. (2014) notes; however, transitional shelter comes with its own set of risks and difficulties as it can be very expensive and often evolves to permanent housing unintentionally (p. 57). This use of transitional housing past its lifespan is one of the biggest issues the sector is struggling with today and with self-recovery bypassing this response, it bypasses these issues as well (Barakat, 2005; Davis, 2015, p. 11; Flinn et al., 2017). Additionally, even though it is true that families may need to spend longer in tents, they have the ability to live inside or directly next to their damaged home which can provide a sense of home and security which can have a positive impact on their ability to rebuild their livelihoods and social connections (Davis, 2015). In fact, of the top shelter priorities for survivors following a disaster, three of the five top priorities involve remaining as close as possible to their damaged or ruined home (Davis, 2015, p. 46).

Another criticism of supporting self-recovery is that it can be a way for governments to avoid talks of redistribution of power and resources (Berner & Phillips, 2005). Berner and Phillips point out that there is a risk of governments being attracted to self-recovery due to the cost-effectiveness of this modality and that governments could leave too much responsibility in the hands of the homeowners without providing adequate supporting assistance. To properly support self-recovery, organizations and governments must be invested in these projects and cannot simply provide encouragement; there must be a net transfer of resources (Berner & Phillips, 2005). Berner and Phillips also highlight that self-recovery cannot be simply about returning a community to their pre-disaster state if that community lived in severe poverty before the disaster. Recovery can only go so far and there must be further development and capacity building initiatives in conjunction with these programs. Additionally, there must be consideration made to vulnerable communities that might not have the ability to rebuild themselves (Berner & Phillips, 2005).

Although there are some disadvantages and risks to self-recovery approaches, if implemented correctly, supporting self-recovery should have a positive impact on recovery efforts and be able to reach more people in need. Aid organizations only have a small role to play in this process though. Self-recovery requires an intersectoral approach with other stakeholders such as local authorities, state governments, the private sector, communities, and homeowners' families. Thus, the question should



really be, how can aid organizations contribute to creating an enabling environment for self-recovery to occur considering all stakeholders involved (Promoting Safer Building Working Group, 2020a).

### 2.3 Supporting Self-Recovery in Post-Conflict Situations

Post-conflict situations add a difficult new layer of complexity to our understanding of supporting self-recovery in emergencies. In fact, conflict-related emergencies are often termed *complex emergencies* which speaks to this fact (Humanitarian Coalition, 2015; Maynard et al., 2017, p. 2). In complex emergencies, there can be both natural and man-made elements contributing to the emergency and there can be different causes of vulnerability not just relating to natural events such as in natural disasters (Humanitarian Coalition, 2015).

To understand these complexities, it is first necessary to understand some fundamental differences in conflicts compared to natural disasters and how this affects shelter interventions. Paul Thompson compiled the table found in Figure 2 taking lessons from Barakat (2003) to provide a short list of some of the key differences between implementing shelter initiatives in natural disasters and conflicts.

After natural disasters	After conflict
Survivors are usually able to return to their home community in a matter of days	Survivors may have been displaced for a long period, even decades
Disasters often strengthen social bonds and commitment to community, energizing collective determination to rebuild	Housing may have been destroyed as part of a strategy of ethnic cleansing; reconciliation may be a prerequisite for reconstruction
Land tenure problems are less frequent or contested	Legal records may be lost, land tenure or prior ownership may be difficult to determine or negotiate, houses may have been destroyed or confiscated
Many disasters result in an outpouring of international support	The risk of a return to hostilities may suppress international support, investment and reconstruction activities
The basic <i>enabling environment</i> of government, financing mechanisms, physical infrastructure, building material supply, construction labour and social networks may still be in place or return to operations relatively quickly	The <i>enabling environment</i> may be non-existent or destroyed and require considerable time to rebuild, especially local authority, security and legal frameworks
Sites of destroyed houses may be unsafe because of geological or hydrological reasons	Reconstruction zones may be mined
Appropriate reconstruction usually requires improvements to the site and/or construction technology	No changes in site or construction technology may be required
Shelter and housing reconstruction programmes should be designed to maximize the economic potential to jump start recovery	The employment of young men and ex-combatants, especially in the construction sector, is one of the highest priority strategies for peacebuilding and must be linked with the other priority strategies of providing basic services and support to clean government

Figure 2. Considerations for shelter initiatives after natural disasters and conflicts. Reprinted from *Shelter After Disaster Second Edition* (p. 113), edited by I. Davis, 2015, Geneva: IFRC and OCHA.

Figure 2 shows that post-conflict situations include additional complexities such as the loss of tenure documentation, the possible presence of underlying social conflicts which affect how people resettle after the conflict, and the risk of continued hostilities suppressing international support. Another important consideration which Davis (2015) notes is that sometimes governments in post-conflict situations will not agree with the aid sector's principle of assistance without bias (p. 112).

The complexities in post-conflict situations have also been observed through examination of past housing aid initiatives in post-conflict settings. Seneviratne, Amaratunga, and Haigh (2013) conducted such a study which revealed that common deficiencies in post-conflict housing reconstruction were the lack of: strategies for vulnerable people, involvement of homeowners, use of vernacular architecture, rebuilding of social networks and linkages, contribution to economic development, cultural appropriateness of the interventions, social and economic appropriateness of the interventions, land tenure consideration, dependency consideration, beneficiary consultation, and adequate performance by NGOs. These past failures indicate the importance of multisectoral approaches to post-conflict housing reconstruction and of considering the social impacts of interventions. Self-recovery methods could address many of these deficiencies as they generally involve homeowners, use vernacular architecture, help rebuild social networks, are culturally appropriate, and foster independence and capacity-building for homeowners.

Self-recovery methods could also be very beneficial in post-conflict contexts since there is often an absence of other options. This is because governments are often crippled or corrupted due to the conflict and aid responses are often severely inadequate due to security risks, access issues, or government prohibitions (Ashdown, 2011; Barakat, 2005; Davis, 2015; Ohiorhenuan, 2011). In fact, only 30% of IDPs and refugees worldwide are housed by international organizations with 70% finding their own accommodation (Flinn et al., 2017, p. 14). In the absence of other options, self-recovery has become the only method for coping with the emergency for many IDPs and refugees, especially in urban settings.

Looking at some past conflicts, it becomes apparent that self-recovery has been prevalent in post-conflict situations for a long time. Barakat (2005) showed that in Bosnia and Kosovo, where 60% and 50%, respectively, of the housing stock was destroyed, "rapid and spontaneous" (p. 158) reconstruction was rampant (pp. 156-158). This spontaneous self-recovery that occurred effectively bypassed the carefully planned reconstruction efforts of donors and NGOs (Barakat, 2005, p. 158). Despite this reality, NGOs continued to support contractor-led builds rather than self-recovery methods due to unfamiliarity with this modality, even though contractor-led builds were

later proved to be 40% more expensive (Barakat, 2005, p. 159). Barakat also noted similar local autonomous housing reconstructions in other post-conflict situations such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, and East-Timor (p. 158). Based on these past examples, it becomes clear that in post-conflict situations the “widespread experience confirms... [that] locally crafted responses hold the key to successful and, ultimately, more sustainable responses” (Barakat, 2005, p. 158). Barakat reinforces the importance of governments and aid organizations supporting this self-recovery process rather than trying to duplicate its efforts, echoing Davis’ words from 1978.

Self-recovery programs must not be planned and conducted in isolation, though, as physical reconstruction is only part of the solution to rebuilding lives in post-conflict environments. Reconstruction programs must be linked to the complex context which post-conflict situations beget and must be accompanied by institutional reforms and efforts to build the capacity of the state (Barakat, 2005, p. 159). These parallel actions are instrumental in creating the enabling environment to support self-recovery (Barakat, 2005, p. 159; Davis, 2015, p. 112). Promoting reforms and capacity building is a challenging feat, though, since some stakeholders tend to have a vested interest in rebuilding to the way things were previously rather than accepting new approaches (Barakat, 2005, p. 159).

## **2.4 Research Objective**

Supporting self-recovery approaches in post-conflict situations is a formidable endeavor which includes multiple layers of complexities and challenges for all parties involved. The current expertise on self-recovery methods within the humanitarian aid sector relates to natural-disaster situations and there is a lack of understanding about the specific considerations for implementing self-recovery support in post-conflict situations. Additionally, as Barakat (2005) explains, self-recovery is widespread in post-conflict situations, perhaps even more so than in natural-disasters, and the aid sector must shift its focus on supporting this process.

This research is focused on bringing clarity to the process of supporting self-recovery in post-conflict situations including highlighting the roles that various actors play in this process. In particular, this research will categorize a framework of factors specific to post-conflict situations that affect the implementation of self-recovery programs. The research will also explore ways that actors can enhance the process of supporting self-recovery in post-conflict situations.

## Chapter 3: Methodology

### 3.1 Research Strategy

A combination of research methods was implemented. Firstly, secondary research was conducted by way of a literature review of literature pertaining to self-recovery within post-conflict contexts. This enabled the identification of factors, barriers, and facilitators relating to the implementation of self-recovery projects. These factors were then grouped into six levels: economic, social, governance, legal, contextual, and technical, which thus formed the Literature Framework. Next, primary research was conducted through a case study of Syria. This was done by means of semi-structured interviews, electronic questionnaires, and participant observation. The data collected was then used to confirm and identify further factors, barriers, and facilitators which were added to the Literature Framework to create the Integrated Framework. Recommendations for improving the support for self-recovery projects were determined based on an analysis of the Integrated Framework. The final Recommendations Table was created by grouping these recommendations into the same six levels as in the frameworks. Lastly, the Recommendations Table was analyzed to identify key cross-cutting areas for action which emerged from the recommendations. Figure 3 shows a schematic of the full research methodology strategy.




Figure 3. Research methodology strategy schematic.

### **3.2 Secondary Research – Literature Review**

The literature review was conducted using Google Scholar, the Universitat Internacional de Catalunya library online and physical libraries, and the Humanitarian Library. Key word searches were used to identify pertinent literature and the snowball method was then used to find other relevant titles. The scope included any literature pertaining to self-recovery specifically in post-conflict contexts. This included case studies of previous self-recovery efforts in past conflicts. The literature review was deemed as complete once data saturation was accomplished.

### **3.3 Primary Research**

#### **3.3.1 Data Collection**

The data collection methods that were used included semi-structured interviews, electronic questionnaires, and participant observation during an expert working group. Semi-structured interviews were prioritized where possible with electronic questionnaires taking their place in cases of limited connectivity or a lack of availability. A total of 14 semi-structured interviews and 12 questionnaires were completed throughout March and April 2020.

#### **3.3.2 Participant Selection**

The intent for participant selection was to include a variety of actors involved in supporting self-recovery in the case study location, Syria. This was to include donors, NNGOs, INGOs, IGOs, private sector representatives, and government representatives. Due to COVID-19 travel restrictions and time constraints, however, government representatives were not able to be interviewed and it was more difficult to include donor and private sector representatives. Because of this, the focus was placed on maximizing the representation of NGO and IGO participants.

NGO and IGO participants were selected by consulting the 2019 UN OCHA Syria HRP appeals for funding which provided a list of NGOs and IGOs implementing shelter aid in Syria. By reading the appeals, organizations conducting shelter rehabilitation modalities were identified and targeted since rehabilitation work can involve self-recovery methods. Organizations were contacted through the information listed in the appeals. Participants within these organizations were selected due to their knowledge of their organization's shelter programs in the field. Participants included shelter specialists, operations managers, project managers, and program coordinators

and managers. A snowball method was used during the interviews which led to further contacts with organizations specifically conducting self-recovery work.

The snowball method also led to the invitation to the expert working group which, in turn, led to further contacts, specifically in the private sector. One interview was conducted with a private engineering firm representative to discuss the potential for private sector involvement in self-recovery projects. Key donors were identified throughout interviews with NGOs and were later contacted with the goal of understanding the identified barriers and facilitators from their perspective. Two donors provided written answers to questions via email and one questionnaire was completed. Because of the small number of private sector and donor participants, information from these participants was used only to confirm and validate information given by the NGOs and IGOs and no definitive factors or recommendations were drawn directly from this data. Table 1 shows the full list of participants.

Table 1: Research Participants

#	Format	Type	Name of Organization	Name of Participant
1	Interview	IGO	IOM	-
2		IGO	-	Henri Stalder
3		IGO	Violet Organization / UNHCR Turkey Hub Strategic Advisory Group	Asmahan Dehny
4		IGO	UNHCR - Damascus Hub	-
5		INGO	Caritas Luxembourg	-
6		INGO	Norwegian Refugee Council	Gareth Lewis
7		INGO	Qatar Charity	Amro Katkhada
8		INGO	Qatar Red Crescent Society	-
9		INGO	World Vision International	-
10		INGO	-	Joud Keyyali
11		NNGO	Violet Organization	Omar Shami
12		NNGO	Social Development International	Muhammad Yasin
13		NNGO	SARD	Fares Al Saleh
14		Private	Arup Group	-
15	Questionnaire	IGO	UN-Habitat	-
16		INGO	Medair	-
17		INGO	Cordaid	-
18		INGO	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development	-
19		NNGO	Syria Relief	-
20		NNGO	Syrian Engineers for Construction and Development	-
21		NNGO	Syria Relief and Development	-
22		NNGO	Ahl Horan Organization	-
23		INGO	Mercy Corps	-
24		INGO	Danish Refugee Council - Damascus Office	-
25		Donor	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance	-
26		INGO	ONG Rescate International	-

Some names of organizations and participants were not able to be included due to confidentiality reasons. As Table 1 shows, a total of 24 organizations participated in this study. Organizations were selected to ensure a distribution of NNGOs, INGOs, and IGOs which can be seen in Figure 4.




Figure 4. Distribution of participants by type of organization.

Organizations were also selected to ensure a distribution of organizations working in government-controlled and opposition-controlled areas of Syria. This distribution can be seen in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Distribution of participants by area of operations.

### **3.3.3 Semi-structured Interviews**

Semi-structured interviews were utilized since an in-depth understanding of the barriers and facilitators was desired. It was important to understand not just what the barriers and facilitators were, but to understand the reasons why this was the case. Semi-structured interviews also allowed for the participant to have the freedom to speak more about the specific issues that they thought were important which, in turn, gave the interviewer a better sense of which barriers and facilitators were the most important.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted in March and April 2020 online over Skype. Each interview was between 20-80 minutes in length, depending on the availability of the participant and their level of engagement. Interviews were conducted in English. The interview questions followed a guide which can be found at Annex A. The bulk of the time spent in the interviews was in identifying and understanding barriers and facilitators to self-recovery projects, identifying lessons learned and recommendations from the participants, and discussing the role of various actors in this process.

### **3.3.4 Electronic Questionnaires**

Electronic questionnaires were utilized in cases where an interview was not possible due to connectivity issues or availability of the participants. Separate questionnaires were made for NGOs and donors. The questionnaires included a combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions with the emphasis on open-ended questions which allowed participants to elaborate on barriers, facilitators, actors, and recommendations. The questionnaires were created using Google Forms and were sent over email. The questionnaires can be found in Annex B.

### **3.3.5 Participation Observation**

A virtual working group was attended on 01 Apr 2020 which was hosted by the Promoting Safer Building Working Group. The workshop, which brought together academics and shelter sector professionals, was focused on self-recovery methods and what initiatives are occurring globally to support self-recovery projects. Table 2 shows a list of participants in this workshop.



Table 2: List of Participants in Promoting Safer Building Working Group April Workshop

Organization	Participants
AECC	Florie Dejeant, Philippe Garnier
Australian Red Cross	Leeanne Marshall
Care International UK	Bill Flinn, Step Haiselden, James Morgan, Beth Simons, Emma Weinstein-Sheffield
CENDEP	Charles Parrack, Sue Webb
Consultants	David Delgado, Rob Fielding, Gareth Lewis, Loren Lockwood
CRAterre	Eugiene Crete, Olivier Moles, Enrique Sevillano
CRS	Jamie Richardson
French Red Cross	Xavier Genot
German Red Cross	Sonia Molina Metzger
Habitat for Humanity	Pia Jensen, Gregg McDonald, Jake Zarins
IFRC	Cecilia Schmöelzer
IOM	Joseph Ashmore, Laura Heykoop, Boshra Khoshnevis
Open University	Lizzie Babister
UIC	Taylor Raeburn-Gibson

This workshop enabled a deeper understanding of self-recovery actions being taken by various organizations and helped to confirm self-recovery terminology and concepts being used by international NGOs.

### 3.4 Data Analysis

Data from the literature review was analyzed by identifying barriers and facilitators then categorizing them into factors and levels, thus forming the Literature Framework. For analysis of primary research, first the audio from semi-structured interviews was transcribed and barriers, facilitators, and recommendations, were highlighted and bolded if they were determined to be of high importance. A similar process was done with the information from the questionnaires. Next, each interview or questionnaire was given a unique four-digit code which identified the data set by type of organization, location of area of operations, and by type of collection method (interview or questionnaire). This was done so that, later, conclusions and relationships could be drawn based on types of organizations and their locations of operations. Next, the barriers and facilitators were placed into the Literature Framework by reference code, thus identifying which organization indicated each barrier and facilitator. Once complete, this product was an Integrated Framework which included factors from both literature and the case study.

Next, the Recommendations Table was developed based on data in the Integrated Framework. This was done by first identifying the most important barriers and facilitators based on the number of times they were cited by participants, the weighting of certain barriers and facilitators as indicated by participants, and by corroboration with the literature. The recommendations were then made to highlight best practices (activating/propelling facilitators), propose solutions to some common barriers, and include direct recommendations from some participants.

## Chapter 4: Case Study - Syria

### 4.1 Introduction to the Syrian Conflict

The Syrian civil war has created the most significant humanitarian crisis in the past decade. Still today, Syria is listed as the third-most country at risk of humanitarian crisis in 2020 as the situation remains volatile (International Rescue Committee, 2020). For this research, the Syrian conflict may be referred to as a post-conflict situation, as it can be understood this way in some parts of the country, although it is acknowledged that the conflict is persisting in many regions of Syria today.

Syria was selected since it is a country which has a significant amount of housing reconstruction occurring presently and there is a great need for further support. Since 2011, more than half of the population of Syria have been displaced by conflict and, with the recent developments in the Idlib region, the situation has been deteriorating further with an additional 830,000 people displaced since early December 2019 (Besheer, 2020; UNHCR, 2018). According to a World Bank Group report (2017), 7% of all housing in Syria was destroyed and 20% partially damaged as of 2017 (p. 21). Up to 1 million people are living in Syrian IDP camps which are overcapacity and lack basic services and, in the Northwest alone, 2.7 million are dependent on aid (OCHA, 2019, p. 48). Shelter is the most pressing need currently in Syria among IDPs (OCHA, 2020b, p. 2).

To further understand the Syrian context, it is important to look at the complex and varied forms of governance within Syria. O'Driscoll (2017) explains that there are no ungoverned spaces in Syria, but rather many different forms of governance with no central oversight. Most of Syria today is controlled by the Syrian government; however, some areas are still under control of Kurdish forces, Turkish forces, and Syrian rebels. In the non-government-controlled areas, local administrative councils often govern municipalities including decisions regarding housing (O'Driscoll, 2017). Figure 6 shows the diverse actors controlling areas in Syria currently.




Figure 6. Map of Syrian civil war actors. Adapted from Live Map, May 13<sup>th</sup> 2020, Syrian Civil War Map. <https://syriancivilwarmap.com/>

#### 4.2 Current Housing Reconstruction Situation in Northwest Syria

Despite the ongoing conflict, many Syrians are rebuilding their lives and homes today and many more are planning on returning soon. A 2018 survey by UNHCR identified that 63% of Syrian refugees interviewed planned on eventually returning to Syria (UNHCR, 2020). Since 2016, there have been 230,418 voluntary refugee returns to Syria with the number growing every year (Humanitarian Needs Overview, 2019). As noted by one participant in this study, COVID-19 recently has also been propelling Syrians to return home over fears of the spread of the virus in the camps (A. Dehny, skype interview, April 16, 2020). Clearly, there are a high number of returnees who are, and will be, arriving back to Syria looking for assistance with rebuilding their homes and lives.

There is a broad spectrum of shelter support currently ongoing in Syria. There are two main Shelter Cluster hubs coordinating responses in Syria: the Turkey hub in Gaziantep and the Syria hub in Damascus. From Gaziantep, UNHCR coordinates 143 member organizations in a cross-border aid operation targeted at IDPs within the opposition-controlled areas of Syria (Shelter Cluster, 2020). From Damascus, UNHCR

coordinates with multiple stakeholders including the government, aid organizations, and development organizations to implement various housing initiatives. Some support is also coordinated by various NGOs from Jordan but with the UN Security Council deciding in January to reduce the number of aid crossings from four (previously in Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq) to only two in Turkey, the aid crossings in Turkey have become even more significant (United Nations, 2020).

Other factors complicating the response in Syria include resistance from the government, funding shortfalls, and existing structural issues prior to the conflict. Firstly, the Syrian government provides a large barrier to aid response as it restricts access of aid organizations, suffers from corruption and a lack of transparency, uses land legislation to erase opposition communities and to enhance pro-regime ones, and co-opts humanitarian funding to advance its own interests (Dacrema & Talbot, 2019; Kayyali, 2019; Sparrow, 2018; Yazigi, 2017). Additionally, funding is a concern for aid organizations in Syria as in 2019, Syria accounted for \$4.41B, or 38%, of the total global gap in humanitarian aid funding (OCHA, 2020a). Finally, pre-existing issues prior to the conflict, such as the fact that 50% of Syrians lived informally, make shelter response requirements such as confirmation of tenure extremely challenging (Dacrema & Talbot, 2019, p. 127).

### **4.3 Self-Recovery Support in Syria**

Aid organization-led shelter interventions currently ongoing in Syria include shelter rehabilitations, collective shelter upgrades, the distribution of NFIs, and emergency shelter provision (Shelter Cluster, 2020). To help define which shelter modalities in Syria can be considered as supporting self-recovery, three levels of classification were created. The higher levels are considered as higher impact self-recovery projects since they give more power to the beneficiaries over the reconstruction process. Traditionally, supporting self-recovery is not defined in terms of levels, but this was done because current definitions of self-recovery are somewhat vague and there can be a wide variety of shelter responses which fall under this definition. These levels, which can be found in Table 3, help to understand the diverse range of shelter responses currently being used in Syria which can be considered as supporting self-recovery.

Table 3: Classification of Levels of Supporting Self-recovery

SSSR Level	Shelter Response Modality
Level I	<p><u>Provision of shelter kits:</u> This method involves the distribution of tools and materials kits by aid organizations. Although in many cases shelter kits are only used for tents and emergency shelter, in some cases homeowners use these kits to repair their homes, which can thus be considered self-recovery support.</p>
Level II	<p><u>Contractor-led shelter rehabilitations:</u> This method involves an aid organization hiring a contractor to conduct the repairs for the homeowner. This is only considered to be self-recovery support if the homeowner has decision-making power and is involved in the process.</p>
	<p><u>Cash-for-work rehabilitations:</u> This method involves the aid organization managing the project themselves and paying workers directly. This was not found to be used frequently.</p>
Level III	<p><u>Homeowner-led shelter rehabilitations:</u> This method involves homeowners being given cash directly from aid organizations for the repairs. Homeowners then either complete the work themselves or hire their own local contractors.</p>

All of the shelter response modalities within Table 3 can be considered as supporting self-recovery because they enable households to repair their homes by themselves or through local labour and these modalities each provide some level of agency to the homeowner (Maynard et al., 2017; Newby, 2018). It is also important to note that the traditional three-prong approach of material, financial, and technical support is still applicable within each of these three levels. Levels I is not discussed significantly in this research but was included to show the range of responses that can be considered self-recovery in this context. Since Level II and Level III consist of various forms of shelter rehabilitation support, shelter rehabilitation programs were the main support modality discussed with participants.

Shelter rehabilitation programs are a commonly used modality of support currently in Syria. Of the 56 organizations that submitted appeals for funding as per the 2019 Syria HRP, 45 organizations listed shelter rehabilitation as a response, which equates to 80% of all organizations. The use of this modality also appears to be on the rise as so far in 2020, it has accounted for 17.6% of the activities of the Turkey hub cluster whereas in all of 2019, it only accounted for 2% (Shelter Cluster, 2020). The demand for shelter rehabilitation support in Syria is high with 157,000 people currently

in need of this modality of support in Northwest Syria alone (OCHA, 2020b, p. 2). One example of a shelter rehabilitation in Syria can be found in Figure 7.




Figure 7. Completed Shelter Rehabilitation in Syria. Provided by F. Al Saleh, SARD and Caritas Luxembourg.

### 4.3.1 Participants' Self-Recovery Programs

The participants of this study varied in terms of their self-recovery support programs. 70% were found to conduct level II support for self-recovery while only 20% conducted level III activities. Participants were also classified in terms of the traditional three-prong approach. Figure 8 shows what percentage of participants provided each of the three types of support.




Figure 8. Percentage of organizations supporting each of the three-prongs of SSSR.

Further statistics regarding the participants' self-recovery programs can be found in Annex C including the number of shelters supported for self-recovery per year, the average cost per shelter, and a summary of the participants' individual stance on self-recovery approaches.

## Chapter 5: Results

### 5.1 Literature Framework

The literature review identified 32 factors which were then grouped into 6 levels: economic, social, governance, legal, contextual, and technical. All barriers and facilitators identified were placed into this framework according to their related factor. Some factors, barriers, and facilitators could have fallen under different levels since they were cross-cutting in nature but were placed in the most appropriate position. A total of 36 pieces of literature were involved in compiling this product. This framework was a baseline which was then supplemented with results from the case study. The full Literature Framework can be found at Annex D and includes literature references for each entry. A simplified version is in Table 4 which includes the factors that were observed most often in the literature.

Table 4: Simplified Literature Framework

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Facilitators
Economic	Funding for Aid Programs / Donors	Donor policies tend towards emergency shelter	Cost-effectiveness of SR over other modalities
		Cyclical donor funding cycles	Donors supportive of cash modalities
	Health of Economy	Fragile post-war economy and industries resulting in less materials, labour, and skills available	International support to strengthen economy and institutions through capacity building
		High rate of inflation	
	State of Housing	Prolonged displacements mean housing has been unkept	
	Institutions	Economic institutions crippled due to conflict	
Social	Community Participation	Social/community organizations disappear during conflict	Participatory modalities which rebuild social networks
	Gender Considerations	Lack of strategies or experience in programs for vulnerable people	
		Lack of men due to men fighting, fleeing, or being killed	
	Permanence / Stability	Lingering tensions from conflict	Aid for host communities and not just IDPs
		Psychological trauma meaning homeowners may not want to return home	Investments to support reintegration of returnees
	Equity of Aid Given	Structural limitations of organization in terms of beneficiary selection	Anti-corruption initiatives
		Lack of strategies for most vulnerable	Prioritizing mechanisms to determine most in need



Levels	Factors	Barriers	Facilitators
Social	Socio-Economic	Complex socio-economic factors of residents	Employment of young men returning from fighting
	Cultural	Difficulties with the implementing organization understanding the local culture	
Governance	State Policies	Aid-prohibiting or inhibiting policies	Aid-accepting policies
	Capacity of Government	Lack of clear government planning, policies, or institutions	International support in rebuilding capacity of state
		Corruption and mistrust	
		Pre-conflict biases of governments towards certain ethnic groups	
	Capacity of Supporting Organization	Lack of prior self-recovery support experience	Prior self-recovery support experience
Lack of logistical capabilities to control distributed projects such as SR		Access to data (demographic, infrastructure)	
Legal	Land Tenure	Tenure documents and records lost in conflict	Flexible policies allowing alternative tenure documentations
		Lack of clear government tenure system	Experience/expertise in local tenure system
		Women not able to attain proper documents	
		Pre-existing issues with tenure system and informal settlements prior to conflict	
	Building Permits / Codes	Lack of government permitting institutions	
Contextual	Length of Displacement	Long displacements resulting in issues of tenure and land conflicts as well as disrepair of houses	Shorter displacements
		Secondary occupation of homes while displaced	
	Conflict Situation	Risks of (re)-emergence of initial or new conflict	Flexible aid programs
		Conflicts among hosts/IDPs/returnees	
	Aid Access	Conflict risk too high for access of aid organization	
		Aid workers specifically being targeted	
Technical	Tools and Materials	Limited local markets or access to international markets	Vernacular methods mean materials easily sourced
	Type of Damage	Safety and technical issues relating to lack of expertise in war-damaged buildings	
	Engineering/ Professional Assistance	Lack of local professionals due to departure during conflict	Presence of technical experts in implementing organization

This Literature Framework shows that there exists a good amount of knowledge about self-recovery methods in post-conflict situations. Before this, the knowledge has been largely scattered between self-recovery literature, post-conflict literature, guidelines, and previous case studies but the Literature Framework now provides a synthesized representation of this information. It is worth noting that the most barriers identified from literature were within the social, governance, and technical levels, which indicates that this is where the bulk of the issues have been from past experience.

## 5.2 Integrated Framework

Data from the case study was added to the Literature Framework to create the Integrated Framework. The case study confirmed many factors identified by literature and identified 5 new factors as well as new barriers and facilitators throughout. The full Integrated Framework can be found at Annex E and a simplified version is in Table 5 which is comprised of factors that showed agreement between literature and participants and were mentioned most frequently.

Table 5: Simplified Integrated Framework

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Facilitators
Economic	Funding for Aid Programs / Donors	Supporting organization's programs underfunded	Donors supportive of cash modalities
		Concerns with timeframe of project and conflict risk which inhibit funding	Transparency and timely communications with donors
		Lack of donor support in SR modalities	Split payments to homeowners throughout stages of project
		Donors prefer 'higher impact' projects with more beneficiary reach	
		Donor concerns over legality and demographic changes	
	Health of Economy	Fluctuating material prices	
	Institutions	Difficulties accessing banks which have been crippled due to conflict	
Social	Community Participation		Strategies for vulnerable people including extra assistance where required
			Prioritization of most vulnerable and women
	Equity of Aid Given	Lack of access to health, food, or other services in community	
		Conflicts between locals regarding who should receive assistance	

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Facilitators
Governance	State Policies	Aid-prohibiting or inhibiting policies	Aid-accepting policies
		Policies prohibiting the return of homeowners	Government supportive of self recovery
		Strong, rigid, and slow legislation resistant to reform	
	Capacity of Supporting Organization to Lead Projects	Difficulties with coordination and management due to dispersed houses	Prior self-recovery support experience
		Competing priorities within aid organization	Organization's goals and values align with self-recovery projects
		Organizational policies against use of cash donations	Contractor-led projects improve ease of coordination and control
		Long timeframe of projects	
	International Bodies and Guidelines	Restrictive guidelines from organizations such as the Shelter Cluster	
Local Authorities	Issues with government approvals		
Legal	Land Tenure	Tenure documents and records lost in prolonged conflicts	Alternative documentations accepted
		Tenure registries targeted and destroyed in war	
		Pre-existing issues with tenure system and informal settlements prior to conflict	
		General complexities of HLP system	
Contextual	Conflict and Security Situation	Risks of (re)-emergence of initial or new conflict	
		Lack of security forces or general security issues	
	Aid Access	Conflict risk too high for access of organization	Local implementing partner organizations and contractors
		Difficulties due to cross-border aid	
Technical	Supporting Organization's Technical Competency	Lack of professionals (engineers, etc.) on staff required for supporting self-recovery	Experience in supporting self-recovery
		Difficulties in controlling quality remotely	Verification through quality audits by third parties
	Availability of Labour		Homeowners have skills required to reconstruct home
	Type of Damage	Safety and technical issues relating to lack of expertise in war-damaged buildings	Damage classification scales
		Structural damage not repairable due to risks and perception that it's reconstruction	
	Infrastructure	Lack of water, electricity, sewage, transport systems due to conflict	Area-based approach assigning entire area response to each org

This framework confirms that many of the factors identified by literature are still relevant in current contexts and that there are many lessons to be learned a current case study which were not present in the literature. This Integrated Framework could be used to inform future literature, guidelines, policy, and practice as it highlights and synthesizes key lessons from both literature and a case study. A large part of the barriers identified from the case study related to economic and governance levels with many barriers relating to stakeholder relations. For further information regarding the effects of various stakeholders on self-recovery projects in Syria specifically, Annex G contains a stakeholder analysis.

### **5.3 Recommendations Table**

The Recommendations Table was developed by identifying ways to reinforce facilitators and mitigate barriers identified in the Integrated Framework. Some recommendations were also developed from specific suggestions given from participants. These recommendations provide stakeholders specific guidance in their implementation of self-recovery support in post-conflict situations. The full Recommendations Table can be found at Annex F and includes 67 recommendations with reference to where these recommendations were developed from, i.e. literature or case study, as well as which specific stakeholders the recommendations are directed to. A simplified Recommendations Table which includes 21 of the 67 recommendations can be found in Table 6 which was developed based on the topics that were most reinforced by both literature and the case study. Note that each recommendation is given an ID code which will be used in the discussion to reference specific recommendations.

Table 6: Simplified Recommendations Table

Level	Topic	ID	Recommendations
1 - Economic	b - Donors	1b1 - Donor Support	Cash-based modalities are gaining in donor support which includes SR modalities. Donors still do not fully understand this modality, however, and advocacy and donor engagement is recommended at all levels to ensure donors understand the benefits and risks of SR support.
		1b4 - Donor Priorities	To facilitate SR projects, donors must focus more on supporting processes rather than outputs and shift away from placing as much value on indicators and numbers of beneficiaries. In the interim, donors and NGOs can work together to combine high beneficiary-reach initiatives with SR initiatives which tend to be lower in beneficiary-reach but higher in impact.
	d - Market	1d1 - Market	SR programs must be adaptable and flexible to account for changes in the prices of materials and services throughout the execution of the projects.
2 - Social	b - Vulnerable People and Women	2b1 - Prioritization	Prioritization of women-headed households and vulnerable people is a best practice which should be continued since these people benefit the most from SR support. With conflicts resulting in an increase in women-headed households, programs should be designed with this in consideration.
	c - Permanence and Stability	2c1 - Desire of Homeowners	SR efforts must be accompanied by other shelter options since SR is not appropriate in all cases, especially when homeowners may not want to return home for psychological reasons.
		2c4 - Young Men Engagement	Organizations supporting SR should seek to employ young men where possible and provide vocational training to improve their skills as required. One way this can be done is through negotiations with contractors so that they will employ a certain number of young men/IDPs.
d - Equity of Aid	2d1 - Beneficiary Screening	Shelter programs must consider all the members of a community and seek to meet the needs of as many as possible with prioritization given to the most vulnerable. Strategies must be generated to accommodate those that do not meet the criteria of SR projects.	
3 - Governance	a - Local Authorities	3a1 - Varying Powers	Strategies must be developed to account for differences in power structures in different areas. Shelter SR programs may look different in these different areas. Cooperation with local authorities is necessary in order to implement SR projects.
	c - Shelter Sector Perception of SR	3c1 - Definition of SR	International guidelines should better define SR and it should be defined in terms of levels of SR since one definition cannot capture the entire scope of interventions.
	d - Capacity of Supporting Organization	3d2 - Managing Dispersed Projects	SR projects are much more difficult to manage than other shelter responses such as refugee camps. Organizations conducting SSSR must have robust logistical capabilities, strong coordination mechanisms, and the ability to move around the area of operations fluidly. Smaller NGOs are perhaps better positioned to support SR.
		3d3 - Competing Priorities	In situations where there are still active conflicts, it is more likely that aid organizations will have to move back and forth from emergency to recovery response. SR projects must be flexible to adapt to these changes or have specific funding and resources earmarked for them.
g - International Coordination	3g3 - Additional Guidelines	International guidelines should be developed to help organizations form strategies for post-conflict SR projects. Specific focus should be placed on the differences between urban vs rural SR support.	

Level	Topic	ID	Recommendations
4 - Legal	4a - Tenure / HLP	4a1 - Lost Documentation	HLP policies such as due diligence and alternative documentation facilitate SR projects in a meaningful way. The more that HLP restrictions can be loosened, the more SR projects will be enabled. This does, however, increase the risk of HLP rights violations and breaching humanitarian principles which could jeopardize future humanitarian aid actions and proper risk analysis should be undertaken.
		4a2 - Registries	Using NNGOs to help with registry has proven to be a successful solution to help the government, but this process is slow. Alternative forms of tenure verification can be used to rebuild these registries.
5 - Contextual	5a - Conflict and Security Situation	5a1 - Conflict Changes Over Time	SR programs are most difficult to implement early in conflicts and increase in relevance as the conflict progresses over time. Funding, however, tends to decrease over the duration of a crisis which is something for supporting organizations to consider in their fiscal planning.
		5a3 - Conflict (re)-emergence	Whereas in natural disaster situations, the disaster event is generally short and once it passes will not re-emerge, post-conflict situations have significant risks of the re-emergence of conflict. When the conflict risk is too high, organizations should consider other ways of supporting SR which are less risky such as through local implementing partners, through the distribution of IEC materials, or other innovative ways to support.
	5b - Returnees	5b2 - Reasons for Return	Those implementing SR projects must consider other forms of aid occurring in the surrounding areas to understand how it might affect the demand for support for SR. SR is only possible when the situation allows for people to return home and begin rebuilding their lives.
6 - Technical	6b - Type of Damage	6b2 - Lack of Expertise in War-Damage	There is a lot of research regarding the effect of natural disasters on structures but not a lot of (public) research regarding how bombs and munitions affect structures, much less how to repair these structures. Further research is required to investigate this and produce technical manuals which could be distributed to aid organizations to help them understand this modality of damage. Private sector involvement here is key. IEC materials could also be developed to help homeowners themselves to understand how this damage can be repaired.
	6c - Infrastructure Systems	6c1 - Infrastructure Systems	Infrastructure repair and reconstruction must be done in conjunction with, or as part of, SR projects. One method to accomplish this is through area-based approaches where an organization is placed in charge of coordinating an entire area rather than just one response within that area.
	6f - Other Shelter Response Modalities	6f2 - SR Housing Stock	For SR to be possible, there must be enough housing stock and homeowners present to facilitate this approach. In post-conflict situations where IDPs still cannot return home and there are not enough houses to repair, other temporary solutions such as transitional housing must be considered. Unfinished home constructions from prior to the conflict provide an opportunity to increase the amount of potential SR housing stock.
	6g - IEC Materials	6g1 - IEC Materials	IEC materials should be shared among NGOs and easily accessible via an online database for wide use. IEC materials could also be developed to assist those that do not qualify for direct support from organizations and, since they are cheap to create and distribute, could reach a wide audience. There is a limitation to IEC materials, though, and there are significant barriers to these being possible for structural repairs.

## **Chapter 6: Discussion of Key Areas for Action**

By analyzing the Recommendations Table, five key areas for action were identified which represent cross-cutting themes of recommendations to better support self-recovery in post-conflict situations. These key areas for action are: 1) maximizing implementing organizations' capacities, 2) contextualizing risks, 3) increasing adaptable and flexible programming, 4) addressing the social dimension, and 5) improving international coordination.

### **6.1 Maximizing Implementing Organizations' Capacities**

Recommendations were identified that could help implementing organizations to maximize their capacity to support self-recovery in post-conflict situations. Because post-conflict situations often result in significantly reduced local government capacities, implementing organizations accept increased responsibilities that, in natural disaster emergencies, often the government would assume. This includes confirming the HLP documentation of homeowners, facilitating payment systems, ensuring adherence to building standards, and properly screening beneficiaries (Davis, 2015; Ohiorhenuan, 2011, p. 9). This necessitates a strong and capable implementing organization and means that opportunities must be taken to maximize the capacity of implementing organizations involved in this work. Two factors allow to maximize Implementing Organizations' Capacities (IOC): previous self-recovery support experience and efficient monitoring and controlling.

#### *Previous self-recovery support experience*

Previous experience in this modality was identified as an important factor in maximizing IOC. In terms of larger organizations such as INGOs, previous organizational experience in self-recovery support from other contexts was noted as increasing their willingness to conduct this modality. Without this previous experience, large INGOs were less likely to attempt this modality for the first time in post-conflict situations due to the complexities involved. It must be noted, however, that previous experience in natural disaster contexts must be evaluated as to its appropriateness in post-conflict settings. Smaller NNGOs, however, did not require the same level of previous self-recovery support experience. Some of these NNGOs had only been founded after the conflict began and, thus, did not have any previous organizational knowledge. What they did possess, however, was a wealth of experience in the local construction sector since many of their staff were local professionals. Thus, for NNGOs, previous experience in

vernacular architecture and construction techniques was the most impactful in maximizing IOC. One local organization, SARD, has been used to train other large INGOs in this modality of programming which demonstrates a successful method of knowledge sharing that can be replicated (rec 3d7).

This NNGO to INGO training highlights a key strategy for maximizing IOC; the sharing of previous experience. INGOs should share lessons learned from previous self-recovery support projects and NNGOs should share their experience in local construction methods (rec 3d1). Additionally, INGOs should consider making their organizational knowledge more accessible to other NGOs by creating self-recovery project databases coordinated through an international body such as the Shelter Cluster. These databases can compile guidelines, data, and lessons learned to be shared amongst organizations to increase IOC (rec 6g1). Many organizations have these databases already internally, but it is important that this information be shared and distributed to enable others.

#### *Efficient monitoring and controlling*

Finding efficiencies in the monitoring and controlling process can also maximize IOC. Monitoring and controlling was one of the main difficulties for NGOs supporting self-recovery since beneficiaries are often dispersed and in areas that are difficult to access by implementing organizations. Because of this, many large INGOs disregard self-recovery projects and opt for more traditional shelter support modalities such as IDP camps and transitional housing settlements because they are easier to monitor and control. Finding efficiencies in monitoring and controlling would, thus, maximize IOC by enabling larger organizations to conduct more self-recovery work.

The main difficulties with monitoring and controlling self-recovery projects were in coordination with local partners, communication with homeowners, controlling quality, and having the resources to conduct required visits and inspections. One strategy identified to mitigate these difficulties is implementing quality control mechanisms such as thorough contracting procedures with contractors, project completion signoffs which include all stakeholders, third-party quality audits, and innovative mobile phone applications which allow for remote project monitoring (rec 3d2, 3d4). The use of local implementing partners was effective as well, especially for INGOs which cannot access the project locations due to security policy restrictions (rec 5c3). The benefits of using implementing partners include the experience of these partners in local construction methods, the removal of some coordination work from the INGO, and the positive contribution to the independence of local NGOs who will maintain a



lasting presence into the future. Some organizations though, have more strict ethical policies against the uses of implementing partners since they perceive this as putting their local partners at more risk than they are willing to assume themselves.

Another opportunity for increasing efficiency in monitoring and controlling is through the proper selection of the self-recovery response modality. Each response modality can be easier to monitor and control, depending on the circumstances, and if NGOs can select responses accordingly, IOC will be maximized. As noted earlier, only 20% of organizations conducted cash-to-homeowner projects with 80% choosing contractor-led projects for the main reason of these projects being easier to monitor and control. As one IGO explained, it is easier to chase one contractor than to chase 1000 landlords. It is worth remembering from literature, however, that in Bosnia, contractors were chosen for the similar purposes of speed and project control, but these benefits were never actually seen compared to the homeowner-led projects (Barakat, 2005, p. 165). This makes it clear that selecting the proper response modality requires an analysis of the specific circumstances. It was determined that contractor-led projects are easier to monitor and control when NGO access is limited, such as in cross-border aid, whereas cash-to-homeowner projects are easier when the NGO can regularly be on site and monitor and control directly. Since most participant organizations were working with limited access, it seems appropriate that 80% of them are working with contractor-led projects in this case. Additionally, contractor-led projects are easier to control for small standardized repairs such as doors and windows whereas cash-to-homeowner are best for non-standardized repairs. It is recommended that organizations select their appropriate response based on these guidelines and, in this way, IOC will be maximized (rec 3d4, 3d8).

## **6.2 Contextualizing Risks**

Recommendations were identified regarding the proper contextualizing of risks by both donors and NGOs. Contextualizing risk means that risks should be assessed based on the actual context and should not be assumed based on other experience. This must be done at multiple levels; for instance, post-conflict contexts must be assessed without preconceived notions from natural disasters and the Syrian context must be assessed without preconceived notions from neighboring countries. Additionally, it means assessing risk iteratively based on a situation that can change considerable over time. Contextualizing risks allows a better-informed assessment of trade-offs between risk and legal framework compliance and without adequate contextualizing of risks, the tendency is to lean towards legal framework compliance, thus

needlessly excluding many people in need. Risks must be contextualized within four areas: 1) HLP documentation, 2) structural repairs, 3) demographic changes, and 4) natural disasters.

#### *HLP documentation*

HLP documentation is one area where donors and implementing organizations must adequately assess trade-offs. As has been shown previously, HLP documentation is often hard to confirm in post-conflict situations yet most NGOs have clear policies against self-recovery support if tenure cannot be confirmed (Davis, 2015; Seneviratne et al., 2013). In Syria, this has resulted in significant amounts of people being excluded from support. Recently, somewhat more relaxed guidelines have been implemented to address this such as the Shelter Cluster Turkey hub's due diligence guidelines and, in the government-controlled areas, the recent acceptance of alternative documentation for HLP. These flexible HLP guidelines are crucial facilitators in post-conflict situations to ensure more beneficiaries can be reached, yet many organizations still say these do not go far enough and continue to be too exclusionary. As a member of the UNHCR Strategic Advisory Group said: "many people are living in reception centers, unfinished buildings, and damaged buildings, and organizations cannot do anything for them because of HLP rights" (A. Dehny, skype interview, April 16, 2020). As a conflict progresses, risk must be iteratively assessed and when there is such a substantive demand for shelter, as in Syria, trade-offs must be reassessed (rec 4a1). In this way, flexibility and adaptability are key principles in contextualizing HLP risks in post-conflict situations.

#### *Structural repairs*

The risk of conducting structural repairs is another area which requires adequate contextualization to the post-conflict environment. Structural repairs come at a heightened risk because they involve repairing structural components such as load-bearing walls, columns, and slabs, which, if not done properly, will cause building collapse. In some ways, the case study showed that this risk is being properly contextualized as the current prohibition on structural repairs is partially based on the lack of understanding of how buildings are damaged in conflicts. In comparison, in natural disaster contexts, structural repairs are possible because there is an understanding of the effects of earthquakes on buildings. In this way, risk is being contextualized to the post-conflict environment and it has been decided that no risk will be taken regarding structural repairs. Despite this reality, it must be questioned as to why this is being accepted and more is not being done to reduce risks. Many organizations lamented the fact that they could not conduct structural repairs with one INGO stating "the ones who need most help, we can't help them, so we focus on the ones who need less help" (INGO, skype interview,

March 31, 2020). What is required in this case is more research which will help to identify risk mitigating measures to lower the risk of these repairs. With this research and knowledge, and with the further development of knowledge products and private-sector partnerships, structural repairs would be possible from a technical standpoint (rec 6b4).

There is another risk relating to structural repair, however, that is not being properly contextualized; the risk of this work being perceived as reconstruction, ie. permanent. Donors specifically were noted to be very risk averse regarding this since reconstruction work is meant to be done by the government. If an aid organization were found to be doing this, it could receive backlash from the government, and this could potentially impact its ability to continue to operate in the area. This risk is not properly being contextualized, though, since it has been clear that in many cases, structural does not equate to permanent and organizations are interpreting these terms very differently. The line which separates a shelter intervention from aid to reconstruction is subjective. In one case, an organization could build shelters including concrete pads and brick walls but had to use plastic sheeting for roofs instead of metal. To some, a concrete pad would appear more permanent and structural than a metal roof. With the lack of a comprehensive agreed definition as to what a reconstruction is, many organizations take the cautionary side and emplace a blanket policy such as with the prohibition on structural repairs. This results in beneficiaries often being provided less than adequate shelter not because of funding or technical issues, but simply because of the organization's arbitrary designation of what reconstruction consists of. Whether or not aid organizations should be conducting reconstruction is another question, but there is clearly an issue with trade-offs when families have been living in tents for over nine years and the long-awaited shelter upgrades are being built to deliberately poor standards. It is recommended that in cases of prolonged conflicts where there is such an immense demand for adequate shelter, that risk be iteratively assessed to account for changing realities on the ground and loosened accordingly to allow for some basic structural work to be done (rec 6f1, 6b4).

### *Demographic changes*

Another risk that must be contextualized is the risk of demographic changes occurring due to interventions. Many organizations noted that donors restrict self-recovery support due to the fear of being accused of contributing to demographic changes within the country. This risk, although warranted, must be contextualized and participants argued that the true reason for demographic changes is the conflict itself, and not the aid. Additionally, donors may be misinformed about the self-recovery process since self-recovery mostly supports homeowners

who have lived in those areas since prior to the conflict meaning no demographic changes would usually be created. While self-recovery programs do also support IDPs in the cases where homeowners rent repaired homes to IDPs, it seems unlikely that these IDPs would settle permanently in a new area simply because of self-recovery support; it is much more complex than this. In prolonged conflicts such as in Syria where some IDPs have been displaced for over nine years, donors must continually reassess the situation and perhaps loosen their policies regarding demographic changes (rec 1b3).

### *Natural disasters*

The risk of future natural disasters must also be contextualized as it has an impact on the design of shelters. It must be understood that in post-conflict situations, there is sometimes no requirement for changes in building techniques since the existing house might have been designed perfectly in accordance with the natural disaster risk in the area. It was noted by participants that some organizations' leadership do not adequately contextualize this risk and implement unnecessary requirements related to *building back better* which have been developed from previous organizational experience. Thus, it is important that organizations and donors contextualize all risks that might not be applicable in post-conflict situations to ensure they are not coming with, what Barakat (2005) describes as, "preconceived practices and assumptions... which override local conventions and capacities" (p.159) (rec 3d5).

## **6.3 Increasing Adaptable and Flexible Programming**

Within post-conflict contexts, adaptability and flexibility are key principles that must be built into every level of shelter support. Most often, however, as Barakat (2005) explains, "external interventions often lack the necessary practical adaptability and flexibility to deal with the dynamics and high levels of uncertainty found in post-conflict environments" (p. 159). Flexibility and adaptability should be further implemented in three domains: 1) funding, 2) scheduling, and 3) scope.

### *Funding*

Funding requires flexibility and adaptability at multiple levels including the donor level and the implementing organization level. At the donor level, it was noted that the funding for self-recovery projects is often given with a rigid prescribed per-shelter amount and that this amount is insufficient for most repairs. This is suspected to be done by donors so that they can control and maximize the number of beneficiaries they are reaching. The consequence of this,

however, is that implementing organizations must significantly limit their support to align with funding, which usually equates to only minor repairs. It is not wrong to maximize the number of beneficiaries, but the implementing organization, not the donor, is best positioned to make this determination and distribute funding for the maximum benefit. Donors must place less importance on quantifying beneficiaries and should consider increasing the flexibility of their funding to allow the implementing NGOs the freedom of determining how that funding is distributed (rec 1a1). Participants also noted that funding is sometimes restricted for material or technical assistance and that cash-based assistance is not permitted, thus significantly limiting support options. Donors should consider more flexibility in terms of their funding to allow cash-based support for self-recovery which will facilitate implementing organizations in variable responses (rec 1b1).

Adaptability of funding is also required which was specifically noted at the implementing organization level. Participants noted that their internal processes did not allow for funding and budgets to be adaptable throughout the project. In post-conflict situations, the market prices for materials can fluctuate greatly on a weekly basis and this means that bills of quantities will need to be adapted throughout the project. Many organizations do not account for this which results in projects being either over budget or unfinished. Self-recovery project budgets must be adaptable and reviewed regularly (rec 1d1).

### *Scheduling*

Scheduling is another area requiring flexibility and adaptability. Self-recovery projects have long timeframes and can take up to one year from the initial selection of beneficiaries to the final completion of construction. This is very challenging for donors because, in post-conflict situations, projects are often disrupted by changes in the conflict throughout the construction. Due to this, participants noted that donors were hesitant to initiate self-recovery projects. If adaptability and flexibility were included into scheduling, however, self-recovery projects could be modified, paused, or rescheduled depending on changes in the conflict and could be successful despite the challenging situation. Self-recovery projects require both donors and organizational leadership to build flexibility and adaptability into their scheduling to account for the uncertainties of post-conflict environments (rec 1b2).

### *Scope*

Implementing organizations and donors must be adaptable and flexible in terms of their program scope. Post-conflict situations evolve rapidly and there is often a fluidity between the emergency and recovery phases. This necessitates the consideration and possible combination

of a wide scope of shelter response modalities including tents and camps, transitional shelters, collective centers, cash-for-rent programs, and self-recovery support. Modalities selected must be flexible and able to change over time with changing circumstances. Participants noted, however, that often, immediate emergency support was prioritized which deferred funding and resources from self-recovery projects, thus causing them to be cancelled. Although this does in some ways speak to the flexibility of the implementing organizations, it highlights the need for flexibility and adaptability in the planning and design of self-recovery projects to ensure their success despite changing priorities. Although emergency response rightly takes priority in these circumstances, self-recovery programs must be designed to be adaptable to ensure they can be modified over time and avoid being cancelled outright (rec 1b1, 6f1, 3d8).

#### **6.4 Addressing the Social Dimension**

The need for addressing the social dimension within self-recovery programs was evident in many ways. Although self-recovery projects inherently lean towards social outcomes, there are still issues relating to the understanding of the social dimension in post-conflict situations and the inclusion of the social dimension into self-recovery programming. The social dimension must be addressed in three areas: intended beneficiaries, program goals, and further research.

##### *Intended beneficiaries*

Firstly, there is a current misunderstanding regarding the social factors of intended beneficiaries of self-recovery programs in the post-conflict context. The literature that self-recovery has been based on has been developed from natural disaster contexts around the idea that homeowners have the skills and ability to rebuild their homes (Davis, 1978). Although to some degree this remains true in post-conflict situations, it does not appear to be as relevant as in natural disasters. This is because in post-conflict situations, many of the men are fighting, have fled, or have been killed and men are often the ones who traditionally do the construction work (Corsellis & Vitale, 2005, p. 50). This is the case in Syria as the number of women-headed households is increasing and, thus, many of the beneficiaries of self-recovery programs are women who often do not have the construction skills to complete repairs themselves (UNHCR, 2014). This must be considered when implementing self-recovery programs in post-conflict situations as these women-headed households will usually not conduct the labour themselves. In fact, participants noted that almost all women-headed households who were given cash decided to contract the work to local labourers. Additionally, self-recovery programs in Syria are

usually targeted towards vulnerable people which might be women with children, the elderly, or the disabled and these people are also likely not able to complete construction work themselves. This is an important social dimension consideration specific to post-conflict situations which goes somewhat against the initial concept of self-recovery as identified by Davis in 1978. The shelter sector must reconsider its basic understanding of intended beneficiaries for self-recovery support in post-conflict situations and must build this into program planning and design (rec 3c2).

### *Program goals*

The social dimension must also be included within the determination of self-recovery program goals. As Barakat (2005) criticizes from other past conflicts, post-conflict housing programs tend to be project-driven, short-term focused, and output-driven rather than outcome-driven (p. 158). Post-conflict housing project goals are often too focused on indicators, quantifiable metrics, and statistics rather than more social-oriented goals such as privacy, health, stability, livelihoods, and security. Barakat notes the requirement for not simply physical interventions, but also for social ones which include capacity building (pp. 158-164). The case study showed that Barakat's criticisms are still valid as participants noted donors as being too output-focused, short-term in thinking, and placing too much importance on numbers of beneficiaries. One INGO participant indicated that sometimes to appease donors, implementing organizations resorted to first conducting a superficial project that could increase their beneficiary count before they could actually focus on completing the work they believed would have the greatest impact to long-term outcomes. Additionally, in general, there was not observed to be a great amount of capacity building initiatives being paired with self-recovery programs and participants noted the specific need for these, especially regarding the training of labourers. There is a clear need for the social dimension to be included within self-recovery project goals to ensure they are outcome-driven, long-term oriented, and include important capacity building initiatives (rec 1b4).

### *Further research*

The social dimension must also be included in further research regarding self-recovery support. Participants noted the absence of research regarding the social benefits of self-recovery interventions and the difficulties in showing the benefits of these projects to donors without this research. Some aid organizations conduct their own internal research and data collection regarding social benefits; however, this information does not seem to be shared widely amongst the shelter sector. Additionally, it was noted that social benefits are hard to

quantify, which makes internal research difficult. Further research regarding methods of quantifying and identifying the social benefits of self-recovery projects would be beneficial helping to educate all stakeholders, including donors (rec 2C3).

## **6.5 Improving International Coordination**

There were several opportunities observed for increased international coordination to support self-recovery in post-conflict situations. This includes improving coordination at all levels and amongst all stakeholders including academics, donors, NGOs, IGOs, and governments. Several areas in which enhanced international coordination can improve self-recovery development are observed: 1) common self-recovery terminology and guidelines, 2) international donor engagement, 3) international operational networks, and 4) private sector partnerships.

### *Common self-recovery terminology*

International coordination could assist in the standardization of self-recovery terminology and processes which is currently lacking. Many participants were not familiar with the concept of self-recovery until the concept was explained and they could understand based on their own organizational terminology. The term most used describing self-recovery in Syria was observed to be self-help since this is how it is phrased in the Shelter Cluster guidelines. Although terminology is somewhat irrelevant as long as the work is actually being done, it does become relevant when information sharing and international guidelines are considered. In the academic sphere, many currently seem to be using the term self-recovery and, because groups like the Promoting Safer Building Working Group are discussing the creation of international guidelines on self-recovery, it will be important to standardize terminology (Promoting Safer Building Working Group, 2020a). Standardization would also facilitate information sharing as it was noted that many organizations have internal self-recovery guidelines, standards, and case studies. With a standardized terminology in place, these could be more easily developed and shared (rec 6g1). Additionally, as has been shown in this study, there are varying shelter responses in post-conflict situations that can be accommodated within the current definition of self-recovery. A clearer definition is required to determine exactly what post-conflict shelter responses are considered self-recovery or, if it is accepted that self-recovery must be defined in terms of levels, these levels must be defined (rec 3c1). This requires an international



cooperation between academics and NGOs and should be addressed at upcoming international shelter sector meetings.

### *Common self-recovery guidelines*

International coordination is also required to establish common self-recovery guidelines. Although self-recovery guidelines exist at the organization level and cluster hub level, there are none at the international/strategic level. As explained in the Promoting Safer Building Working Group Workshop, although many organizations claim to conduct self-recovery support, “there are no guidelines, nor tools, nor even guiding principles to support the implementation of self-recovery projects” (Promoting Safer Building Working Group, 2020b). This is true for all self-recovery and when considering post-conflict self-recovery, it is possible that a separate guideline may be required. The idea of guidelines being created was supported by participants with 75% responding favorably to the idea. Other guidelines were also requested by participants such as technical guidelines for repairing war-damaged buildings, with 73% of participants supporting this, and guidelines on long-term cash modality strategies in post-conflict contexts (rec 6b2). International cooperation could facilitate these guidelines as academics, NGOs, and IGOs must make the first steps in developing these (rec 3g3). The international community could also work to better compile research on self-recovery modalities in general. 88% of participants agreed that further research on this modality of support would be beneficial, not only to facilitate execution, but to help convince donors that this modality of support is worth the investment (rec 2c3).

### *International donor engagement*

There is a need for international coordination in engaging donors regarding self-recovery projects. This should not be done with a view to promote self-recovery over other methods, but simply to help donors to understand this modality including its benefits and limitations. Participants noted the requirement to constantly convince donors of the effectiveness and merits of this modality. Although some organizations were not as concerned with this topic, this seemed to be because those organizations had identified a select few supportive donors and had the benefit of being able to receive regular funding from them. Others, with more ‘conservative donors’, as one participant put it, struggled in this effort. The international community is important here because it could influence this perception of donors at the higher level. This could occur through increased research into these modalities, through advocacy and increased discussion at the international level, and through direct donor engagement and education (rec 1b1, 2c3). One participant noted that their donor was initially hesitant to fund self-

recovery projects but that by bringing the donor to the site of one of these projects, the positive impact was seen, and this facilitated funding for future self-recovery projects. Further efforts such as this could be done at the international scale and would go a long way in terms of the donor community's acceptance of these methods (rec 1b4).

#### *International operational networks*

There is an opportunity for the formation of international operational networks of academic institutions, private companies, aid and development organizations, and intergovernmental organizations to facilitate self-recovery operations. Participants noted the need for such networks due to the intersectoral nature of self-recovery work and the lack of international coordination bodies at lower levels. Intersectoral approaches are required since repairing a house in a post-conflict situation requires significant coordination for rubble removal, repairing roads, reconnecting water and sewage lines, reconnecting electricity, and potentially UXO disposal. An international operational network could be formed to coordinate between the government agencies and the various aid and development actors. Currently, various organizations are doing this on their own without any coordination bodies in place. This act of connecting all actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction would also serve to begin building the connections and systems which would be the foundation for building capacity back into local institutions (rec 3b1). As Barakat (2005) said, this is the real area that international cooperation can support post-conflict situations, through the strengthening of institutions and systems (pp. 159-164).

#### *Private sector partnerships*

International cooperation in the establishment of private sector partnerships could provide an opportunity to increase support for self-recovery in post-conflict situations. Specifically, international private engineering firms could partner with international NGOs to support self-recovery with specialized engineering work. Some participants expressed the opinion that they would not be comfortable with their organization leading structural repair work since they believe that this is not the realm of an aid organization, but that of a private engineering firm. It is true that international private engineering firms could potentially contribute greatly to the amount of engineering work to do in post-conflict situations, but the same barriers identified previously will arise regarding perceptions of reconstruction. That being said, if this issue can be addressed, private sector engineering firms such as Arup Group and Mott MacDonald could be good partners for NGOs since they already have international development departments and have some experience in post-disaster engineering (rec 3f2).

As part of this study, one interview was conducted with Arup Group and determined that although these types of partnerships could be possible, there are significant barriers from the perspective of engineering firms which include security of their personnel, speed of response, financing, and normative constraints. One area identified which has immediate potential for collaboration is in the creation of IEC materials. Another potential opportunity identified was in online, or remote, engineering (rec 6b2). Remote engineering is a burgeoning new subject and it uses technologies such as drones and cameras to allow engineers to assess structures remotely. This is becoming especially relevant today as COVID-19 has recently forced engineering firms to rethink how work can be done at a distance. Innovations in international coordination such as this could help to close some of the gaps and break down some of the barriers currently holding self-recovery back in post-conflict environments.

## Chapter 7: Conclusion

This research has brought some clarity to the complex process of supporting self-recovery in post-conflict situations by identifying common factors involved in the implementation of these projects and categorizing them via an Integrated Framework. Additionally, key areas for action were highlighted which should be considered by actors involved in the implementation of these projects. These results are hoped to assist implementing organizations, donors, and policy writers in their understanding of these projects and how best to move forward to enhance this support. This research has highlighted key considerations for supporting self-recovery in post-conflict situations, as complimentary to post-natural disasters contexts, and shows that this is a much more difficult endeavor in most cases. As one participant described it, "conflicts are harder than disasters, there is no hard line when pain is over" (F. Al Saleh, skype interview, April 7, 2020).

The case of Syria is an important one to study not only because of the amount of housing reconstruction that is required, but because of the increase in self-recovery support that is occurring there and the opportunity to capitalize on the trend towards cash-based projects currently within the humanitarian sector. Many organizations are currently struggling with these projects against all the barriers identified in this study; however, some are paving the way forward with successful self-recovery initiatives. This includes organizations like SARD, who have recently completed projects with homeowner satisfaction levels of 94% and with 80% of homeowners believing the assistance was appropriate and that their quality of life had improved (Coysh & Nicolini, 2019; SARD, 2019). It would be a challenge to find other shelter interventions with such levels of support from beneficiaries. More actions such as these are required which focus on long-term outcomes and not outputs and which value social benefits.

Further research is required, in part, to highlight some of these social benefits. With further research into long-term social benefits of various types of shelter interventions, it may become more clear what advantage self-recovery has over other methods. These social benefits include health benefits, and with the current COVID-19 crisis, this is very relevant today. Further research is also required to confirm the framework of factors identified here with other cases and to expand this analysis to other stakeholders which were not able to be included here. These other stakeholders include local authorities and governments as well as the most important stakeholder involved; the homeowners themselves. Due to the limitations of this study, the focus was placed on supporting organizations but there needs to be further work to understand how the homeowners feel about this type of support and to identify gaps in

support from their perspective. In the end, the homeowners are the ones that should have the strongest voice, which is what the entire concept of self-recovery is based on.

Self-recovery support is not the only answer and this study has shown some limitations it can have in post-conflict situations. But as Davis (1978) and Barakat (2005) have repeatedly tried to inform the humanitarian aid sector, housing interventions should be meant to support local populations and not to replace any action that could be undertaken themselves and self-recovery support is one of the best ways to achieve this goal. Self-recovery will undoubtedly occur with or without support from the aid sector, but it remains to be seen if the sector will finally shift towards this modality of support as a foundational element of shelter response strategies. As the world grapples with an increasingly difficult global refugee crisis, any effort to support durable solutions should be made. Self-recovery support could be one way to help create an environment where refugees and IDPs can finally return home.

## References

- Ashdown, P. (2011). *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review*.
- Association, S. (2018). *The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response* (fourth edi). Geneva.
- Barakat, S. (2003). Housing Reconstruction After Conflict and Disaster. *Humanitarian Practice Network (HPN)*, 44(43), 1–37. Retrieved from [www.odihpn.org](http://www.odihpn.org)
- Barakat, S. (2005). *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.
- Berner, E., & Phillips, B. (2005). Left to their own devices? Community self-help between alternative development and neo-liberalism. *Community Development Journal*, 40(1), 17–29. <https://doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsi003>
- Besheer, M. (2020, February 14). Displacements from Syria's Idlib Hit Record Levels. *Voice of America*. Retrieved from <https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/displacements-syrias-idlib-hit-record-levels>
- Corsellis, T., & Vitale, A. (2005). *Transitional Settlement: Displaced Populations*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
- Coysh, J., & Nicolini, D. (2019). *Evaluation of SARD's infrastructure department and its activities in NW Syria*. Biel.
- Dacrema, E., & Talbot, V. (2019). *Rebuilding Syria: The Middle East's Next Power Game*. Milan: ISPI.
- Davis, I. (1978). *Shelter After Disaster*. Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic Press.
- Davis, I. (2015). *Shelter after Disaster Second Edition*. Geneva: IFRC and OCHA.
- Flinn, B., Schofield, H., & Morel, L. M. (2017). The case for self-recovery. *FM Review*, 55, 12–14. Retrieved from [www.fmreview.org/shelter](http://www.fmreview.org/shelter)
- Hamdi, N. (1995). *Housing Without Houses: Participation, Flexibility, Enablement*. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing Ltd.
- Hendriks, I. E., Basso, M., Sposini, D., van Ewijk, L., & Jurkowska, H. (2016). *Self-built housing as an alternative for post-disaster recovery*. Eindhoven University of Technology.
- Humanitarian Coalition. (2015). What Is a Humanitarian Emergency? Retrieved March 14, 2020, from <https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca/what-is-a-humanitarian-emergency>
- Humanitarian Needs Overview. (2019). 2019 Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Needs Overview. Retrieved February 16, 2020, from <https://hno-syria.org/#sector-needs>
- International Rescue Committee. (2020). The top 10 crises the world should be watching in 2020. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from <https://www.rescue.org/article/top-10-crises-world-should-be-watching-2020>

- Kayyali, S. (2019). *Government Policies Co-Opt Aid and Reconstruction Funding in Syria | HRW*. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/06/28/rigging-system/government-policies-co-opt-aid-and-reconstruction-funding-syria>
- Maynard, V., Parker, E., & Twigg, J. (2017). *The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Interventions Supporting Shelter Self-Recovery Following Humanitarian Crises: an evidence synthesis*. Humanitarian Evidence Programme. Oxford: Oxfam GB.
- Newby, T. (2018). What is self-recovery? – The challenge for humanitarian agencies. Retrieved January 11, 2020, from Care Insights website: <https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/development-blog/what-is-self-recovery-the-challenge-for-humanitarian-agencies>
- OCHA. (2019). *Global Humanitarian Overview 2020*. Geneva: OCHA.
- OCHA. (2020a). *Global Humanitarian Overview 2020: Monthly Funding Update 29 February 2020*. Geneva: OCHA.
- OCHA. (2020b). *Syrian Arab Republic: Recent Developments in Northwest Syria: Situation Report No. 13*. OCHA.
- O'Driscoll, D. (2017). Governance in Syria. In *K4D Helpdesk*. UK Department for International Development.
- Ohiorhenuan, J. F. E. (2011). Post-conflict Recovery: Approaches, Policies and Partnerships. In *Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD)*. Leuven.
- Opdyke, A., Javernick-Will, A., & Koschmann, M. (2019). Assessing the impact of household participation on satisfaction and safe design in humanitarian shelter projects. *Disasters*, 43(4), 926–953. <https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12405>
- Parrack, C., Flinn, B., & Passey, M. (2014). Getting the Message Across for Safer Self-Recovery in Post-Disaster Shelter. *Open House International*, 39(3), 47–58.
- Pascual, A., Baghajati, A., & Jahn, I. R. (2018). *Shelter Repair and Rehabilitation Guidelines, 2018 Draft Edition*. Global Shelter Cluster.
- Promoting Safer Building Working Group. (2020a). *April Workshop - Activity Report*.
- Promoting Safer Building Working Group. (2020b). *April Workshop Presentation*.
- SARD. (2019). *IHA Monitoring Report: November 2019*.
- Schofield, H., & Flinn, B. (2018). *The State of Humanitarian Shelter and Settlements: Chapter 4. Switzerland*: Global Shelter Cluster.
- Seneviratne, K., Amaratunga, D., & Haigh, R. (2013). Addressing housing needs in minimizing the problems of post conflict housing reconstruction. *2013 International Conference on Building Resilience*, 14. Ahungalla: University of Salford.
- Shelter Cluster. (2020). X-Border Operation - Turkey Hub. Retrieved May 1, 2020, from <https://www.sheltercluster.org/response/x-border-operation-turkey-hub>

- Skretteberg, R. (2019). 2019 will be another year of crises. Retrieved April 29, 2020, from Norwegian Refugee Council website: <https://www.nrc.no/shorthand/fr/2019-will-be-another-year-of-crises/index.html>
- Sparrow, A. (2018, September 20). How UN Humanitarian Aid in Syria Has Propped Up Assad. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2018-09-20/how-un-humanitarian-aid-has-propped-assad>
- Turner, J. F. C. (1976). *Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments*. London: Marion Boyars.
- Turner, J. F. C., & Fichter, R. (1972). Housing as a Verb. In *Freedom to Build* (pp. 148–175).
- Twigg, J., Lovell, E., Schofield, H., Morel, L. M., Flinn, B., Sargeant, S., ... D 'ayala, D. (2017). *Self-recovery from disasters: An interdisciplinary perspective*. London: ODI.
- UNHCR. (2014). *Woman Alone: The fight for survival by Syria's refugee women*. Geneva.
- UNHCR. (2018). *Comprehensive Protection and Solutions Strategy: Protection Thresholds and Parameters for Refugee Return to Syria*. Geneva.
- UNHCR. (2020). Situation Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions. Retrieved February 16, 2020, from [https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria\\_durable\\_solutions](https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions)
- United Nations. (2020). Avoiding Midnight Deadline, Security Council Extends Authorization of Cross-Border Aid Delivery to Syria, Adopting Resolution 2504 (2020) by Recorded Vote. Retrieved April 30, 2020, from United Nations Press Releases website: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14074.doc.htm>
- World Bank Group. (2017). *The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the Conflict in Syria*. Washington.
- Yazigi, J. (2017). *Destruct to Reconstruct: How the Syrian Regime Capitalizes on Property Destruction and Land Legislation*. Friedrich Ebert Foundation.



## Annex A: Interview Guide

### A) General Questions

1. In what capacity does your organization currently work in the shelter sector in Syria?
2. In which locations? (Will be kept confidential)

### B) Factors

*This research defines self-recovery as: “[the process when] households rebuild or repair damaged or destroyed homes using their own assets [which] can be savings, remittances, materials (salvaged, donated or owned), social and community assets, local skills and labour” (Parrack, 2014)*

*It defines supporting self-recovery as: “[providing] one or a combination of material, financial and technical assistance; during the relief and/or recovery phase; to enable affected households to repair” (Maynard, 2017)*

3. Does your organization support self-recovery according to these definitions?
  - a. If so, how?
    - i. Please describe the process in detail.
    - ii. With materials, financial support, or technical support?
    - iii. How many shelters each year does your organization support?
    - iv. Have these projects been successful?
    - v. How long do these projects take?
    - vi. What is the average cost per shelter?
    - vii. Are they done through a contractor or through cash grants?
  - b. If not, why?
    - i. What would have to change in order to begin supporting with this modality?
4. Do you follow the Shelter Cluster guidelines?
  - a. Do you think they are appropriate for the context?
5. Do you plan on doing these or more in the future?
  - a. Do you see a trend towards these projects in the sector?

### C) Barriers & Facilitators

6. What are some barriers making self-recovery more difficult, or stopping you from supporting these projects? (suggest some of the following to cue them if they cannot think of any)
  - a. Legal? (building codes, permits?)
  - b. International aid agreements?
  - c. Access to areas?
  - d. Security?
  - e. Lack of experience?
  - f. Lack of technical staff?
  - g. Lack of knowledge products/manuals?
  - h. Competing priorities (emergency support)?
  - i. Lack of donor support?
  - j. Timeframe concerns?
  - k. HLP/Tenure issues?
  - l. State laws?
  - m. Technical issues with war-damaged buildings/lack of expertise?

- n. Local conflicts between community members?
- 7. What are some facilitators or reasons your organization is able to run these projects?
  - a. Cost-effectiveness over other modalities?
  - b. Timeframe/speed?
  - c. Donor support?
  - d. Social factors – increases livelihoods, sense place, community build?
  - e. Prior experience?
  - f. Technical expertise on staff?
  - g. Local construction skills?
  - h. Social workers/science on staff?

#### **D) Actors**

- 8. I want to understand the role and attitude of other actors or stakeholders in self-recovery projects (government, donors, etc). Which stakeholders are supportive and which are resistant?
  - a. Donors?
  - b. Government / municipality?
  - c. Private Sector?
  - d. Within NGOs?
  - e. Homeowners?
- 9. Who has the most power in deciding what type of projects NGOs will run? (Donors, NGOs, government)

#### **E) Recommendations**

- 10. What do you think could be done to improve the supporting self-recovery process to either make it run more effectively or to be able to reach more people?
- 11. Is there anything that your organization requires to better support self-recovery?
  - a. More technical staff?
  - b. More research/data?
  - c. Staff training?
  - d. Guidelines on self-recovery?
  - e. Technical guidelines?
- 12. Are you personally supportive or resistant?

#### **F) Conclusion**

- 13. Is it ok to use your organization's and your name personally in my report?
- 14. Is there any information given that you do not want included in my report?
- 15. Do you know any other actors currently involved in self-recovery projects that you could put me in contact with?
- 16. Do you have any photos or other resources you could share with me?

## Annex B: Questionnaires

### NGO Questionnaire – Google Forms

Section 1 of 5

#### Research Questionnaire for NGOs: Supporting Self-Recovery in Post-Conflict Situations

Form description

What organization do you work for? \*

Short answer text

What type of organization is it? \*

- International NGO
- National NGO
- Community Organization
- Intergovernmental Organizations (ex. UN)
- Government Organization
- Other...

Does your organization currently work in the shelter sector in post-conflict situations? \*

- Yes
- No
- Other...

Does your organization currently work in the shelter sector in Syria? \*

- Yes
- No
- Other...

If so, which locations in Syria? (will be kept confidential)

Short answer text

⋮

This research defines supporting self-recovery as: "providing one or a combination of material, financial and technical assistance; during the relief and/or recovery phase; to enable affected households to repair, build or rebuild their own shelters themselves or through using the local building industry" According to this definition, does your organization provide any shelter programming supporting self-recovery in Syria? \*

- Yes
- No

After section 1 Continue to next section ▼

Section 2 of 5

## Barriers and Facilitators to Self-Recovery - NGOs Which do have SR programs ⌵ ⋮

Description (optional)

⋮

How does your organization support self-recovery?

- Materials
- Financial Support
- Technical Support (engineering, architecture, etc)
- Other...

What are the facilitators within your organization which enable you to run self-recovery type projects? (Please feel free to include others than those listed)

- Donors supportive to this modality of shelter support
- Prior experience with self-recovery projects
- Technical expertise within organization such as engineers and architects
- Organization's values align well with this type of project
- Other...

What are the facilitators relating to the Syrian situation which enable your organization to run self-recovery projects?

- International agreements enable this type of aid
- Locals have strong construction skills
- Inaccessibility of Syria makes self-recovery projects more viable
- Other...

What are the two most important facilitators out of those mentioned above to your organization's ability to run these programs?

Short answer text  
.....

What are the barriers within your organization which make these projects more difficult to run?

- Lack of prior experience in these programs
- Lack of technical staff such as engineers or architects in the organization
- Lack of sufficient manuals or technical documents to support these projects
- Lack of donor support for these projects
- Competing priorities within organization
- Lack of funding
- Concerns with timeframe of projects
- Other...

What are the barriers due to the Syrian situation which make these projects more difficult to run.

- Lack of infrastructure
- Complexities relating to HLP / tenure
- State policies and laws
- Issues accessing project areas in Syria
- Security issues
- Unpredictable conflict situation
- Safety and technical issues relating to warfare-damaged buildings
- Other...

What are the two most important barriers out of those mentioned above to your organization's ability to run these programs?

Short answer text  
.....

After section 2 Go to section 4 (Actors Involved )



## Barriers and Facilitators to Self-Recovery - NGOs Which do not have SR programs

Description (optional)

What is the main reason you do not conduct self-recovery type programs?

Long answer text

What are the barriers within your organization which prevent it from conducting self-recovery work in Syria? (Please feel free to include others than those listed)

- Lack of experience in these types of programs
- Lack of technical staff inside organization such as engineers and architects
- Lack of manuals and technical documents to assist in leading these projects
- Organization fundamentally disagrees with this type of project
- Lack of donor support for these projects
- Competing priorities within organization (including emergency response)
- Lack of funding
- Concerns with timeframe of project
- Other...

What are the barriers relating to the Syrian situation which prevent your organization from conducting self-recovery work in Syria?

- Lack of infrastructure
- Complexities relating to HLP / tenure
- State policies and laws
- Issues accessing project areas in Syria
- Security issues
- Unpredictable conflict situation
- Safety and technical issues relating to warfare-damaged buildings
- Other...

What are the two most important barriers out of those mentioned above that prevent your organization from conducting self-recovery projects?

Long answer text

⋮  
What would need to change, either within your organization or relating to the Syrian conflict, for your organization to be more involved in self-recovery projects?

Long answer text

Of the following stakeholders, in your experience, what is their position or attitude towards a self-recovery approach to shelter aid in Syria?

	Supportive	Neutral	Unsupportive	Unsure
Government of Syria	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
International NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Community Organiz...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Private Sector	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Donors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Academics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Homeowners them...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Homeowner's famil...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

After section 3 Go to section 5 (Improving Self-Recovery Programs) ▾

#### Section 4 of 5

## Actors Involved



Description (optional)

Please rate the following stakeholders in terms of how much power they have throughout your self-recovery projects.

	High Power	Some Power	No Power	Unsure
Your Organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Donors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Government of Syria	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Private Sector	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Academics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Homeowners them...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Homeowner's famil...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Of the following stakeholders, in your experience, what is their position or attitude towards a self-recovery approach to shelter aid in Syria?

	Supportive	Neutral	Unsupportive	Unsure
Government of Syria	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
International NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
National NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Community Organiz...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Private Sector	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Donors	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Academics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Homeowners them...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Homeowner's famil...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

After section 4 Continue to next section

Section 5 of 5

## Improving Self-Recovery Programs

Description (optional)

In general, are you supportive to the use of self-recovery programs in post-conflict situations?

- Yes
- No
- Other...

Do you think any of the following would help your organization to support more homeowners in self-recovery?

	Yes	No	Unsure
International Guidelines ...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Technical guidelines on r...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Further data and researc...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
A manual that could be d...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
More technical staff with...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Do you have any further ideas for ways to improve the process of supporting self-recovery?

Long answer text



## Donor Questionnaire – Google Forms

### Research Questionnaire for Donors: Supporting Self-Recovery in Post-Conflict Situations

Form description

Which organization do you work for? \*

Short answer text

Which of the following types/modalities of program does your organization support?

- Cash (in general)
- Cash for rent
- Shelter rehabilitation through cash to homeowners
- Shelter rehabilitation through contractors
- Tents / emergency shelter
- Non-food item (NFI) distribution
- Transitional housing
- Technical/construction training
- Materials or tools
- Other...

...

Based on your answers above, which is the most frequent modality of shelter support in Syria?

Short answer text

Of the following modalities of shelter support, what is your organization's perception of this type of intervention?

	Supportive	Neutral	Not Supportive	Unsure
Cash (in general)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cash for rent	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Shelter rehabilitatio...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Shelter rehabilitatio...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Tents / emergency ...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Non-food item (NFI...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Transitional housing	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Technical/construc...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Materials or tools	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

...

Does your organization fund different modalities of shelter support in natural disasters compared to conflict situations? Please explain

Long answer text

What are the specific factors relating to the situation in Syria which affect the type of shelter support that is selected?

Long answer text

Could you please elaborate briefly on your current philosophy regarding cash-based interventions?

Long answer text

Do you perceive a current trend of your organization supporting more cash-based interventions than in the past?

- Yes
- No
- Other...

☰  
Are you familiar with the concept of self-recovery?

- Yes
- No
- Other...

If so, does your organization support this concept of support (in general)

- Yes
- No
- Other...

## Annex C: Participants' Self-Recovery Program Information

The following data was noted during interviews and questionnaires and provides additional background information relating to the participant organizations. This includes the number of shelters supported for self-recovery per year, the average cost per shelter, and the participants' personal stance on whether they support self-recovery as a modality. Figure C1 shows the annual number of shelters rehabilitated through some form of self-recovery for 8 of the participants who were able to give this data.




Figure C1. Annual number of shelters rehabilitated through some level of self-recovery.

The annual number of shelters rehabilitated through some level of self-recovery is interesting because it shows the difference between a large organization like UNHCR Damascus with 5,000 shelters per year and a smaller organization like Violet Organization with only 125. It also shows, however, that smaller organizations can sometimes output just as many self-recovery shelters as larger organizations such as with SARD having 1,800 annual shelters and IOM with 2,000. The average number of shelters per year across all organizations was 1,953. If UNHCR Damascus is removed, since it is the only organization operating in government-controlled areas, the average would be 1,437 shelters for organizations working in opposition-controlled areas. It is also worth noting that SARD, SDI, and Qatar Red Crescent all conduct level III self-recovery support while the others only conduct up to level II.

The total combined annual output from all organizations in Figure C1 is 10,625 shelters. With the current demand for rehabilitations in Northwest Syria alone being 157,000 according to OCHA (2020b), it seems that there is a considerable need for an increased amount of support for rehabilitations. That being said, this is only 8 of 45 organizations which were conducting rehabilitation work as of 2019 which means that there is a lot of data not accounted for here.

Figure C2 provides data on the average cost per shelter from 7 participants who were able to provide this data.





Figure C2. Average cost per shelter

As can be seen in Figure C2, there is a vast discrepancy in the amount that is being funded per shelter across various aid organizations in Syria. The average cost per shelter averaged across all organizations is \$1,171 USD, however, if UNHCR Damascus and NRC are eliminated since they both operate in government-controlled areas, the average would be only \$790 USD. This is expected since the Shelter Cluster’s guidelines, which apply in opposition-controlled areas, restrict rehabilitations to being less than \$1,000 USD (Pascual, Baghajati, & Jahn, 2018). As many participants noted, even for moderate damaged homes, this amount is not enough to conduct many of the required repairs.

Figure C3 shows the percentage of how many participants were personally supportive of self-recovery support projects.



*Figure C3: Responses to question 'Are you personally supportive of support to shelter self-recovery?'*

The responses in Figure C3 show that 94% of participants were supportive of self-recovery projects and none were directly unsupportive. Although it is hard to quantify the benefits of self-recovery projects since it is the social benefits that set this modality apart from other shelter responses, this support from aid workers shows that the people implementing these projects currently in the field are seeing the benefits of these projects directly and that they believe they are worth the effort.

## Annex D: Literature Framework

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Literature Reference	Facilitators	Literature Reference
Economic	Funding for Aid Programs / Donors	Donor policies tend towards emergency shelter programs	(Davis, 2015, p.161; Pascual et al., 2018, p. 20)	Cost-effectiveness of SR over reconstruction	(Davis, 2015; Hendriks, 2016; Schofield 2018)
		Donor funding cycle can be cyclical	(Corsellis, 2015, p. 60)	Supportive Donors	(Corsellis, 2015, p. 60)
		Donors resistant to cash donations or iterative housing modalities	(Davis, 2015, p.161; Pascual et al., 2018, p. 20; Barakat, 2005)		
	Health of Economy	Fragile post-war economy and industries resulting in less materials, labour, and skills available	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011; Barakat, 2005, p. 155)	International support to strengthen economy and institutions	(Barakat, 2003, Barakat, 2005)
		High rate of inflation / currency fluctuation	(Maynard, 2017; Ohiorhenuan, 2011)	Informal sector labour and materials	(Barakat, 2005, p. 165)
		Fluctuating material prices	(Coysh & Nicolini, 2019)		
	Homeowner Assets	Lack of work due to job shortages post-conflict	(Barakat, 2008)	Remittances from family	(Parrack, 2014, p. 2)
		Homeowners have a lack of savings or other loan options	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, pp. 2-3)	Families and friends provide accommodation	(Flinn, 2017, p. 14; Davis, 2015, p. 46)
	State of Housing	Maintenance of housing not kept up in wartime	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, pp. 2-3)		
		Prolonged displacements mean housing has been empty and unkept	(Seneviratne et. al. 2013, pp. 2-3)		
Institutions	Difficulties using banks which have been crippled due to conflict	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011; Barakat, 2005, p. 155)			
Social	Community Participation	Social/community organizations disappear during conflict	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011)	Participation rebuilds social networks	(Burde, 2004; Cordair, 2019; Pascual et al., 2018, p. 13)
		Privatization of reconstruction and lack of participatory planning	(Bădescu, 2015, p. 55)	Use of local building techniques involves people	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 5; Barakat, 2002)
				Strong social networks prior to conflict	(Maynard, 2017, p. 8)

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Literature Reference	Facilitators	Literature Reference
Social	Vulnerabilities and Gender Considerations	Lack of experience in programs requiring unique gender considerations due to gender role reversals or GBV	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 5; Barakat, 2002; Corsellis, 2005, p. 50)	Gender-equitable aid initiatives	(Corsellis, 2005, p. 191)
		Lack of strategies or experience in programs for vulnerable people	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 5; Barakat, 2002)	Strategies for vulnerable people including extra assistance where required	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 5; Barakat, 2002)
		Lack of men due to men fighting, fleeing, or being killed	(Corsellis, 2005, p. 50)		
		Improper categorization of vulnerable people and assigning responsibilities to separate agencies	(Barakat, 2002, p. 810)		
	Permanence / Stability	Lack of Social Networks due to conflict	(Zuckerman and Greenberg, 2004, p. 79)	Aid directed at host communities as well as IDPs	(Corsellis, 2005, p. 195)
		Lingering tensions from conflict	(Calame and Pasic, 2009, p. 10)	Investments to support reintegration of returnees	(Kibreab, 2002, p. 77)
		Divergence of people due to conflict	(Burde, 2004)	Government leadership to create jobs and social services initiatives	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011, p. 9)
		Lack of acceptance of new immigrants/refugees	(Kibreab, 2002)	Homeowner historical sense of home and connection to land	(Dacrema, 2019, p. 127)
		Homeowners do not want to live in homes due to psychological trauma	(Hovey, 2000; Bădescu, 2014)	Creation of jobs through aid programs	(Corsellis, 2005, p. 195-197)
		Fear of dependency due to program	(Barakat, 2003, p. 7)		
	Equity of Aid Given	Participant selection limitations of organization	(Pascual et al., 2018, p. 28)	Anti-corruption initiatives	(Maier, 2010; GSDRC, 2012)
		Geographical limitations of organization	(Pascual et al., 2018, p. 20)	Prioritizing beneficiaries adequately	(Pascual et al., 2018, p. 20)
		Lack of Strategies for most vulnerable	(Barakat, 2002, p. 810)	Clear beneficiary selection criteria	(Maynard, 2017, p.2)
		Fear of fraud within program	(Barakat, 2003, p. 7; Corsellis, 2005, p. 15)		
		Lack of access to health, food, or other services in community	(Corsellis, 2005, pp. 157-160)		
	Goals of Community	Goals of community may differ from supporting organization	(Schofield & Flinn, 2018)		
	Socio-Economic	Complex socio-economic factors of residents	(Barakat, 2003, p. 23)	Employment of young men returning from fighting	(Davis, 2015, p. 113)
Cultural	Difficulties in supporting organization understanding local culture	(Twigg et al., 2017)			



Levels	Factors	Barriers	Literature Reference	Facilitators	Literature Reference
Governance	State Policies	Aid-prohibiting or inhibiting policies	(Kayyali, 2019; Aras, 2019, p. 4; Cordaid, 2019)	Aid-accepting policies	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011, p. 14)
		Conflicts between State reconstruction and aid reconstruction activities	(Kayyali, 2019; Barakat, 2005)	International body to hear tenure claims	(Dacrema, 2019. p. 128)
		National laws inhibiting returnees	(Dacrema, 2019, p. 127)		
		Aid-prohibitive policies of neighboring countries	(Aras, 2019, p. 4)		
	Capacity of Government	Reduced capacity and institutions due to conflict	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011, p. 9; Davis, 2015)	International support in rebuilding capacity of state	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011, p. 9; Davis, 2015; Barakat, 2005)
		Lack of clear government planning, policies, or institutions	(Barakat, 2003; Barakat, 2005)	Public-private partnerships	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011)
		Corruption and mistrust	(Ohiorhenuan, 2011, p. 2; Corsellis, 2005; Matthews, 2016)		
		Private sector lobbying and influence	(Barakat, 2009, p. 1078)		
		Pre-conflict biases of governments towards ethnic groups	(Yazigi, 2017; Davis, 2015, p. 113)		
		Government desire to rebuild more modern or against vernacular methods	(Yazigi, 2017)		
		International/political influence over policy	(Osseiran, 2017; Kayyali, 2019)		
	Capacity of Supporting Organization to Lead Projects	Lack of prior shelter self-recovery support experience	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)	Prior self-recovery support experience	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)
		Lack of logistical/staffing capacity	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)	Robust logistical capacity	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)
		Lack of experience managing technical projects	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)	Experience managing technical projects	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)
		Competing priorities within aid organization	(Pascual et al., 2018)	Flexible or unrestrictive donors	(Davis, 2015, p.161; Pascual et al., 2018, p. 20)
		Organization's goals and values do not align with self-recovery projects	(Davis, 2015, p. 11)	Organization's goals and values align with self-recovery projects	(Davis, 2015, p. 11)
		Lack of flexibility	(Barakat, 2005)	Access to data (demographic, infrastructure)	(Barakat, 2005)
		Lack of dissemination of lessons learned	(Barakat, 2005)		

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Literature Reference	Facilitators	Literature Reference
Governance	Beneficiary Registration and Tracking	Displaced do not want to be recognized by authorities since living in informal conditions	(Corsellis, 2005, p. 97)		
Legal	International aid agreements	Lack of clear/timely international agreements	(Daily Sabah, 2019)	Unrestrictive aid agreements	(Kayyali, 2019)
	Land Tenure	Tenure documents and records lost in prolonged conflicts	(Davis, 2015, p. 113; Barakat, 2003; Dacrema, p. 129)	Flexible organizational policies allowing support to participants even without proper tenure	(Nemeth, 2017)
		Lack of knowledge and experience in local tenure processes and requirements	(Corsellis, 2005)	Experience / expertise in local tenure system	(Corsellis, 2005)
		Lack of clear government tenure system	(Barakat, 2003; Barakat, 2005)	Strong tenure system prior to conflict	(Nemeth, 2017; Barakat, 2005; Dacrema, 2019)
		Women often cannot attain proper documents	(Lastarria-Cornhie, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)		
		Pre-existing issues with tenure system and informal settlements prior to conflict	(Nemeth, 2017; Barakat, 2005; Dacrema, 2019)		
	Building Permits and Codes	Prohibitive or complicated building regulations and codes	(Barakat and Zyck, 2011)	Improvements to building codes	(Barakat, 2003, p. 27)
		Lack of government permitting institutions	(Barakat and Zyck, 2011)		
	Hiring Practices and Labour Laws	Formal contracts required between aid org and homeowners for reconstruction programs	(Pascual et al., 2018)	Simple contracting regulations	(Pascual et al., 2018)
		Restrictive minimum wage or day labour laws	(Pascual et al., 2018)		

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Literature Reference	Facilitators	Literature Reference
Contextual	Length of Displacement	Long displacements resulting in issues of tenure and land conflicts as well as disrepair of houses	(Davis, 2015, p. 113; Barakat, 2003)	Short displacements	(Barakat, 2003)
		Secondary occupation of homes while displaced	(Dacrema, 2019)		
		Difficult reintegration of homeowners	( <i>Impact Initiatives</i> , 2018)		
	Environmental	Risk of natural disasters	(Davis, 2015; Corsellis, 2005, pp. 214-215)	Planning to align program with construction season	(Corsellis, 2005, pp. 59-60)
		Seasonal climate changes affecting construction season and livelihoods	(Corsellis, 2005, pp. 59-60)		
	Conflict and Security Situation	Risks of (re)-emergence of initial or new conflict	(Davis, 2015)	Flexible aid programs	(Barakat, 2005, p. 159)
		Conflicts among hosts /IDPs/returnees	(Maier, 2010)		
		Competition for property or land	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, pp. 2-3)		
	Aid Access	Conflict risk too high for access of organization	(Davis, 2015, p. 113)		
		Aid workers specifically being targeted	(Ashdown, 2011, p. 38)		
Difficulties due to cross-border aid		(Pascual et al., 2018)			
Technical	Supporting Organization's Technical Competency	Lack of experience in supporting self-recovery	(Corsellis, 2005; Berner & Phillips, 2005)	Experience in supporting self-recovery	(Corsellis, 2005; Berner & Phillips, 2005)
		Lack of professionals (engineers, etc.) on staff required for supporting self-recovery	(Corsellis, 2005)	Well-staffed organization including professionals required to support self-recovery	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)
		Lack of local professionals due to departure during conflict	(Barakat, 2008)		
	Availability of Labour	Lack of contractors or skilled workers to hire due to conflict	(Corsellis, 2005)	Homeowners have skills required to reconstruct home	(Corsellis, 2005, p. 191; Barakat, 2002)

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Literature Reference	Facilitators	Literature Reference
Technical	Tools and Materials	Limited local markets or access to international markets	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 4)	Materials easily sourced due to vernacular methods being used	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 4)
		Lack of access to tools or equipment	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013)	Equipment and tool resources of aid organization	(Corsellis, 2005)
		Degradation of local natural resources/materials due to conflict	(Corsellis, 2005, pp. 54-56)	State ensures availability of materials	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 4)
	Selection of shelter Response Modality	Shelter response modality constraints within organization	(Pascual et al., 2018)	Flexible shelter response options of aid organization	(Pascual et al., 2018)
		Prioritization of speed and quantity over vernacular methods	(Seneviratne et. al., 2013, p. 5)	No change in construction technology may be required since damage due to conflict not natural disaster	(Davis, 2005, p. 113)
	Type of Damage	Safety and technical issues relating to lack of expertise in war-damaged buildings	(Pascual et al., 2018)	Expertise within organization to provide damage assessments	(Corsellis, 2005; Pascual et al., 2018)
		Lack of guides, standards, or manuals to help organization in assessments and monitoring	(Pascual et al., 2018; Seneviratne et. al., 2013)		
	Building Safety	Potential of presence of UXOs	(Corsellis, 2005, pp. 217-219; Barakat, 2005, p. 172)	Police or military support in UXO disposal	(Corsellis, 2005)
		Potential of houses being structurally unsafe due to damage	(Pascual et al., 2018, p. 30)		
	Infrastructure	Lack of water, electricity, sewage, transport systems due to conflict	(Barakat, 2005)		

## Annex E: Integrated Framework

LEGEND
Black text = factors from literature review Green text = factors from case study Bold = deemed important by participant
Organization Reference Codes
Each organization is given a code for identification. The organization relating to this code is kept confidential.
Codes are in the format <b>XY#</b> <b>X</b> = Type of Organization where: N = NNGO I = INGO G = IGO <b>Y</b> = Area of Operations where: O = Opposition-controlled areas only G = Government-controlled areas only W = Whole of Syria (opposition and government-controlled) <b>#</b> = Participant number where: Numbers 1-12 and 24 are Interviews Numbers 13-23 and 26 are Questionnaires

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Economic	Funding for Aid Programs / Donors	Donor policies tend towards emergency shelter	NO10	Cost-effectiveness of SR over other modalities	<b>IO5</b>
		Donor funding cycle can be cyclical		Supportive Donors	IW16, NO18, NO17, NO19, IW6, NO11, IW23
		Supporting organization's programs underfunded	NO18, NO17, NO19, NO20, IG26	Changes in conflict situation which lead to increases in funding	NO17
		Donors resistant to cash donations or iterative housing modalities	<b>NO12</b>	Organization has experience understanding various donors' desires and requirements	<b>NO12</b>
		Concerns with timeframe of project and conflict risk which inhibit funding	IW16, GG13, IG15, <b>NO12</b> , IO5, GO1, <b>IO9</b> , <b>IG26</b>	Donors visit site to see effectiveness of SR over tents	IO5

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Economic	Funding for Aid Programs / Donors	General lack of donor support for this modality	NO18, NO17, NO19	Donors supportive of cash- based modalities	IW6, GO1
		Donors prefer 'higher impact' projects with more beneficiary reach	IO7, IO5, IO9	Split payments to homeowners throughout stages of project	NO12, IO8, IW6
		Individual / private donors who have more strict requirements	IO7	Transparency and timely communications with donors	NO12, NO11
		Donor concerns over legality and demographic changes concerns	NO12, IO5, NO10, IO9, IO24		
		Issues of donor trust of NNGOs	NO12, GO1		
		Donors deny projects due to perception of lack of expertise within implementing organization	NO12		
		Donors will not fund any project requiring interaction with government	GG2		
		Donor not flexible meaning adaptive and flexible programming not possible	GO1		
		Donors perceive it is still an emergency and thus no long-term shelter solutions should be implemented	IO24		
		Projects are urban which is costlier than rural	GO1		
	Health of Economy	Fragile post-war economy and industries resulting in less materials, labour, and skills available	IO7	International support to strengthen economy and institutions	
		High rate of inflation / currency fluctuation	GO1	Informal sector labour and materials	
		International sanctions			
		Fluctuating material prices	GO1, IO24		
	Homeowner Assets	Lack of work due to job shortages post-conflict		Remittances from family	
		Homeowners have lack of savings, other loan options		Families and friends provide accommodation	
	State of Housing	Perception that homeowners will not spend money on shelter due to other priorities such as food, water, health	NO20		
		Prolonged displacements mean housing has been empty and unkept		Unfinished houses from before the conflict provide further housing stock to rehabilitate	
	Institutions	Maintenance of housing not kept up in wartime			
		Difficulties using banks which have been crippled due to conflict	GG13, IO5		
		Money transfers more costly increasing project budget	IO5, IO24		

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference	
Social	Community Participation	Social/community organizations disappear during conflict		Participation rebuilds social networks		
		Privatization of reconstruction and lack of inclusivity		Use of local building techniques encourages participation		
				Strong social networks prior to conflict		
				Community willing to engage with organization	NO17	
				Community-based approach involving withholding of payments until community finishes	NO12	
				Focus group discussions with community	IO8	
				Community discussions prior to household level	NO12	
				Announce project through local councils, religious centres, social media	NO11	
	Vulnerabilities and Gender Considerations	Lack of experience in programs involving gender role reversals or GBV			Gender-equitable aid initiatives	
		Lack of strategies or experience in programs for vulnerable people			Strategies for vulnerable people including extra assistance where required	NO12, IO5
		Lack of men due to men fighting, fleeing, or being killed			Prioritization of most vulnerable and women	NO12, IO5, NO11
		Improper categorization of vulnerable people and assigning responsibilities to separate agencies			Vulnerability criteria adhered to as per cluster guidelines	IO8, NO11, IO24
		Most vulnerable people not able to lead SR work themselves	GO1			
	Permanence / Stability	Lack of Social Networks due to conflict			Aid given to host communities as well as IDPs	
		Lingering tensions from conflict			Investments supporting reintegration of returnees	
		Divergence of people due to conflict			Government leadership to create jobs and social services initiatives	
		Lack of acceptance of new IDPs or refugees	GG2		Homeowner historical sense of home and importance of connection to land	
		Homeowners do not want to live in homes due to psychological trauma			Capacity building training given to homeowners such as in tendering process	NO12
		Fear of dependency due to program			Creation of jobs through aid programs	NO11
		Homeowners are not interested in returning home due to conflict	GG2			
		Long-term social impacts unclear - lack of research	IW6			

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Social	Equity of Aid Given	Participant selection limitations of organization		Anti-corruption initiatives	
		Geographical limitations of organization		Prioritizing communities for assistance	
		Lack of Strategies for most vulnerable		Clear beneficiary selection criteria of aid organization	
		Fear of fraud within program		Vulnerability assessments	NO12
		Lack of access to health, food, or other services in community	GO1, NO20		
		Conflicts between locals regarding who should receive assistance	IO5		
	Community Aspirations	Goals of community may differ from supporting organization			
	Socio-Economic	Complex socio-economic factors of residents		Employment of young men returning from fighting	
	Cultural	Supporting organization does not understand culture	IW16		
Governance	State Policies	Aid-prohibiting or inhibiting policies	GG13, IG15, IG14, NO20, GW4, GG2, IG26	Aid-accepting policies	IW16, NO18, NO17, NO19, GW4
		Conflicts between State reconstruction and aid reconstruction activities		International body to hear tenure claims	
		National laws prohibiting return to homes		Government supportive of self recovery	GW4, NO12, GG2
		Aid-prohibitive policies of neighboring states		Lack of policy in non-government-controlled areas	GG2
		Policies prohibiting the return of homeowners	GO3		
		Strong, rigid, and slow legislation resistant to reform	GG2		
		Not all legislation being written and recorded. Some is local customary law (ie. HLP)	GG2		
		Government does not want city reconstructed as before	GG2		
	Capacity of Government	Reduced capacity and institutions due to conflict	IO24	International support in rebuilding capacity of state	
		Lack of clear government planning, policies, or institutions		Public-Private Partnerships	
		Corruption and mistrust			
		Private sector lobbying and influence			
		Pre-conflict biases of towards ethnic groups			
		Government desire to rebuild more modern or against vernacular methods			
International/political influence over policy					



Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Governance	Capacity of Supporting Organization to Lead Projects	Lack of prior shelter self-recovery support experience	NO21, IG26	Prior self-recovery support experience	IW16, NO18, NO17, NO19, IW23
		Lack of logistical/staffing capacity	GO1, IO8	Robust logistical capacity	
		Lack of experience managing technical projects		Experience managing technical projects	IO8
		Difficulties with coordination and management due to dispersed houses	IO7, GO3, GO1, IO8	Flexible or unrestrictive donors	
		Competing priorities within aid org	IG15, NO19, NO20, IO7, NO12, GO1, NO10	Organization's goals and values align with self-recovery projects	IW16, NO18, NO17, IW6
		Organization's goals and values do not align with self-recovery projects	NO20	Access to data (demographic, infrastructure)	
		Organizational policies against use of cash donations	IO7, IO9	Contractor-led projects improve ease of coordination and control	NO12, GO1, IO8, NO10
		Organizational knowledge not contextualized (build back better, GBV)	NO12, GG2	Framework agreement signed with contractor to agree on standard unit price	NO11
		Long timeframe of projects	IW6, GO1, IO8, NO10	Social workers on staff to assess social factors	NO12
		Limited internet in Syria making monitoring and reporting more difficult	NO11	Smaller sized NGO - allowed for filling of niche SR space	IO5
		Selection of location influenced by donors who prioritize numbers of beneficiaries over needs	NO11	Supporting organization staff enjoy this type of work and feels fulfillment thus increasing organization's capacity	IW6
		Lack of initiative by implementing NGOs to begin self-recovery projects	IO24	Low turnover of staff facilitating longer-term projects	IW6
		Lack of flexibility		Quality is better in cash-to-homeowner	NO12
		Lack of dissemination of lessons learned		Experienced NGOs train others in cluster	NO12
			Quality control feedback mechanisms such as satisfaction surveys and complaint hotlines	IO24	
	Beneficiary Registration and Tracking	Displaced do not want to be recognized by authorities since living in informal conditions			NNGOs assist government in registrations
Government does not conduct registrations fast enough slowing down response (6 months)		GW4			

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Governance	International Coordinating Bodies and Guidelines	Shelter Cluster guidelines too restricting	NO12, IO5, IO8	Shelter Cluster Guidelines standardize responses and provide guidance	IO7, IW6
		High level prioritization and assessments do not reflect needs on ground		Flexible shelter cluster leadership and approvals for funding	GO3
		Competition for funding leads to organizations trying to influence guidelines	NO12	Detailed organizational guidelines to supplement cluster guidelines	IW6
		Lack of low level intersectoral coordination	GW4, IW23		
	Local Authorities	Issues with government approvals	IG15, GW4, IW23	Negotiations with government to streamline approvals process	GW4, GG2
		Pressure of authorities onto organization	IO5, IW6	Memorandum of understanding signed between organization and state ministries	IW23
		Complex power-sharing agreements between government and local authorities	GG2		
		Complex entities of power (ISIS, Turks, Kurds, Al Qaeda, Government)	GG2	Cooperation and agreements with authorities	GG2
Legal	International Aid Agreements	Lack of clear/timely international agreements		Unrestrictive aid agreements	
	Land Tenure	Tenure documents and records lost in prolonged conflicts	GO3, GG2	Flexible organizational policies allowing for alternative tenure documentation	
		Tenure registries targeted and destroyed in war	GG2	Experience / expertise in local tenure system	
		Lack of knowledge and experience in local tenure processes and requirements		Strong tenure system prior to conflict	
		Lack of clear government tenure system		Alternative documentations accepted	GW4
		Women often cannot attain proper documents			
		Pre-existing issues with tenure system and informal settlements prior to conflict	GO3, GG2		
		Previous illicit housing transactions	GG2		
		General complexities of HLP system	IW16, NO18, GG13, NO17, IG15, NO19, IG14, NO20, NO21, GO3, NO12, IO5, IO9, IW23, IG26		
		Registries targeted and destroyed in conflict	GG2		
Lack of data management systems such as registries	GG2				

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Legal	Building Permits and Codes	Prohibitive or complicated building regulations and codes		Improvements to building codes	
		Lack of government permitting institutions			
	Hiring Practices and Labour Laws	Formal contracts required between aid org and homeowners for reconstruction programs	GO1	Simple contracting regulations	
		Restrictive minimum wage or day labour laws			
	ID Documentation	Prohibitive policies requiring ID documentation of participants			
Leasing	Homeowners renege on contracts and evict IDPs	IO9, IO24	Contracts signed between owner and IDP for 1-3 years in exchange for repairs	GO1, IO8	
Contextual	Length of Displacement	Long displacements resulting in issues of tenure and land conflicts as well as disrepair of houses		Short displacements	
		Secondary occupation of homes while displaced			
		Difficult reintegration of homeowners			
		Fragmented return			
	Environmental	Risk of natural disasters and lack of expertise to train to build back better		Planning to align program with construction season	
		Seasonal climate changes affecting construction season and livelihoods			
		Harsh winter season making repairs and construction more difficult	NO10		
	Conflict and Security Situation	Risks of (re)-emergence of initial or new conflict	IW16, IG14, NO21, IW6, IO9	Stable conflict situation	
		Conflicts among host/IDP/returnee		Flexible aid programs	
		Competition for property or land			
		Lack of security forces or general security issues	IW16, NO18, IO7, NO12, IW6, IO8		
		Repaired houses are taken over by hostile forces	IO9		
		Repaired houses are re-damaged in war	IO5		
Security risk assessments required for new areas making new projects difficult		IW6			

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Contextual	Aid Access	Conflict risk too high for access of organization	IG15, <b>GO1</b>	International agreements allowing border-crossing sites for aid	
		Aid workers specifically being targeted		Local implementing partner organizations and contractors	IO5, GO1, NO10, IO24
		Difficulties due to cross-border aid	NO20, <b>NO21</b> , <b>NO12</b> , <b>IO5</b> , IO8, NO10, IO24	Local professionals used but coordinated from neighboring country	<b>NO12</b> , NO10
		Time consuming permits required from neighboring country government	NO12, IO8	Technology used for monitoring and controlling such as phone applications	NO11
	Response Phase Transition			Fluid transitions between emergency/post-conflict/early recovery phases create quickly changing circumstances	<b>IW16</b>
Technical	Supporting Organization's Technical Competency	Lack of experience in supporting self-recovery		Experience in supporting self-recovery	NO12, IW6
		Lack of professionals (engineers, etc) on staff required for supporting self-recovery	IG15, NO1, IO8, IO9	Well staffed org including professionals required to support self-recovery	IW16, <b>NO18</b> , NO17, NO19, <b>NO12</b> , IW6, NO11
		Lack of local professionals due to departure during conflict		Regular monitoring visits to site (every 1-2 weeks)	<b>NO12</b>
		Difficulties in controlling quality remotely	GO3, GO1	Architects on staff	<b>NO12</b>
				Verification of implementing partner work through quality audits by third parties	GO1, NO12
				Contracts/MOUs signed with all parties to ensure quality and tracking of funding	IO8, NO12
	Availability of Labour	Lack of contractors or skilled workers to hire due to conflict		Homeowners have skills required to reconstruct home	IW16, NO17, <b>NO19</b>
	Tools and Materials	Limited local markets or access to international markets		Vernacular methods mean materials easily sourced	
		Lack of access to tools or equipment		Equipment and tools of aid org	
		Degradation of local natural resources/materials due to conflict	IO7	State ensures availability of materials	

Levels	Factors	Barriers	Organization Reference	Facilitators	Organization Reference
Technical	Selection of shelter Response Modality	Shelter response modality constraints within organization		Organization has flexible shelter response options	
		Prioritization of speed and quantity over vernacular methods		No change in construction technology may be required since damage due to conflict not natural disaster	
				Use of proper transitional housing for those not included in SR programs or as a temporary measure.	IO8
	Type of Damage	Safety and technical issues relating to lack of expertise in war-damaged buildings	IW16, NO18, NO17, <b>NO19</b> , NO20, <b>NO12</b>	Expertise within organization to provide damage assessments	
		Lack of guides, standards, or manuals to help organization in assessments and monitoring	NO20	Consultations with universities and external professionals to assess war damage	<b>NO12</b>
		Any structural damage not repairable due to risks and perception that it is reconstruction	IO7, GW4, IO5, IW6, GO1, IO9, IO24	Damage classification scales	NO12, IW6, GW4
		Looting causes secondary damage to homes including copper wire being taken, etc.	<b>IO5</b>		
	Additional Support to Homeowners			Guidance booklets or other IEC materials given to homeowners with instructions on how to conduct work	<b>NO11</b>
				Market price list given to homeowners to show how much items and materials should cost	<b>NO11</b>
				Technical training provided as required to homeowners	<b>NO12, NO11</b>
	Building Safety	Potential of presence of UXOs	<b>IW16</b>	Police or military support in UXO disposal	
		Potential of houses being structurally unsafe due to damage		Support from military or police for UXOs	
	Infrastructure	Lack of water, electricity, sewage, transport systems due to conflict damage	GG2, IO8, NO11, IW23	Area-based approach assigning entire area response to each org	GW4, GG2

## Annex F: Recommendations Table

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
1 - Economic	a - Budget per House	1a1 - Budget per House	The amount of money spent by NGOs on each SR shelter was usually dictated by the amount of funding received by the donor and not based on the needs of the homeowners. This amount was often within the cluster guidelines but was not enough to conduct all required repairs. The amount spent per shelter was much greater in government-controlled areas than non-government-controlled areas.	IW6, IO8	Donors must realize that by prescribing an amount per shelter, this will result in many homes only receiving limited SR support. Flexible funding for NGOs would allow full SR of shelters with NGOs having the freedom to prioritize based on beneficiary needs and vulnerabilities. The amount of funding per shelter dictated by the cluster guidelines should be increased to allow for further repairs.	Donors, Shelter Cluster
	b - Donors	1b1 - Donor Support	Donors were both one of the biggest barriers but also facilitators to SR projects based on all interviews. Donors vary considerable in terms of their acceptance of cash and SR modalities. There is a trend currently towards more cash projects being supported in general across donors.	Literature and all interviews	Cash-based modalities are generally gaining in donor support which includes SR modalities. Donors still do not fully understand this modality, however, and advocacy and donor engagement is recommended at all levels to ensure donors understand the benefits and risks of SR support.	All
		1b2 - Time and Risk Concerns	Donors were hesitant to fund SR in post-conflict situations due to concerns over the timeframe and risk of the situation changing. Sometimes, the risk level that donors perceived differed to the opinion of the NGO on the ground.	IW16, GG13, IG15, NO12, IO5, GO1, IO9	SR projects are very challenging in post-conflict situations which are rapidly changing. As best possible, risk assessments should be conducted and updated regularly and should be done in conjunction with implementing partners who know the situation on the ground. Risk mitigation procedures should be implemented. Programs should be designed to be flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances.	Donors, implementing NGOs
		1b3 - Demographic Changes Concerns	Donors were hesitant to fund projects based on concerns over contributing to demographic changes. There are various levels of concerns that donors have over this issue with some donors wanting technical documents sent to them to review and ensure no permanent constructions are being made and other donors requiring hardly any specific information.	NO12, IO5, NO10, IO9, IO24	Donors should relax concerns over demographic changes in certain cases where it is clear that the conflict is actually to blame for this rather than the aid itself. Measures can be put in place to ensure as best possible that IDPs will return to their homes, but it should be understood that in all cases, this will not be possible or desired by the IDPs themselves.	Donors

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
1 - Economic	b - Donors	1b4 - Donor Priorities	Donors were more interested in projects with higher beneficiary reach and, in general, more concerned with numbers and indicators rather than with the high social impacts of SR projects.	Literature and IO7, IO5, IO9	Donors should focus more on supporting processes rather than outputs and not be as concerned with indicators and numbers of beneficiaries. Donors and NGOs should work together to combine high beneficiary-reach initiatives with SR initiatives which tend to be lower in beneficiary-reach but higher in impact. Donors should visit the projects where possible to fully grasp the benefits of SR projects. NGOs can help to educate donors on the high impact of SR projects including the fact that often the repaired households will take in one or two other families.	Donors, implementing NGOs
		1b5 - Donor Trust	A lack of trust in local NGOs by donors prohibited some funding for SR projects.	NO12, GO1, NO10	Donors should be more understanding with local NGOs. Even though they do not have the same experience and record as larger INGOs, this does not mean they are less trustworthy or capable. Many local NGOs are formed quickly after conflicts and will require time to meet the same standards as large organizations. Local NGOs are often the best-positioned implementing partners for SR projects since they have knowledge of the local culture and construction methods and are dedicated to the long-term vision of this work.	Donors
		1b6 - Government Interaction	For those organizations working in government-controlled areas, the biggest donor-related barrier was that donors will not fund programs which require interaction with the local government. This makes it very difficult since any SR work requires intersectoral coordination with government agencies.	GO1	Donors must loosen restrictions involving interactions with governments and emplace mitigation measures to minimize risks instead of blanket policies such as this.	Donors
		1b7 - Emergency Phase Constraints	One organization pointed out that donors are hesitant to support longer-term shelter interventions since the conflict is still considered an emergency which means that interventions should be kept minimum.	Literature and IO24	In cases of prolonged conflicts, the classification of these situations as emergencies can be damaging in some ways. When people have been living in tents for 9 years and it is clear that semi-permanent or permanent shelter solutions are required, donors should support further interventions than in normal emergency situations.	Donors

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
1 - Economic	c - Payments to Homeowners	1c1 - Payments to Homeowners	The best practice identified in Syria is to split payments throughout phases of the project so the homeowners are motivated to finish the construction in order to receive the final payment.	NO12, IO8, IW6	This payment-splitting should be taken as a best practice for other situations as it helps to avoid fraudulent beneficiaries and also helps to ensure the project is completed.	Implementing NGOs, IGOs
	d - Market	1d1 - Market	Price fluctuations are common in post-conflict situations including Syria. These are most severe in the initial phases of the conflict and the markets tend to stabilize later in the conflict.	Literature and GO1, IO24	SR programs must be adaptable and flexible to account for changes in the prices of materials and services throughout the execution of a project.	All
	e - Labour Market	1e1 - Labour Market	Post-war economies result in skills and labour leaving the country.	Literature and IO7	Technical capacity building should be supported by NGOs to help restore skills to local labourers.	INGOs, NNGOs, IGOs
	f - Institutions	1f1 - Banking System	The banks in Syria are a barrier as they are difficult to access and are expensive, specifically for money transfers.	Literature and GG3, IO24, IO5	When relying on cash transfers in post-conflict situations, the state of the banks must be considered and factored into planning and budgeting.	All
2 - Social	a - Community Participation	2a1 - Community Participation	One strategy used to rebuild social networks and participation was setting community-level benchmarks which must be met before final payments are received by any homeowners. This forces the community to come together to assist each other in finishing their homes and has proven successful.	Literature and NO12	Similar strategies such as this community participation payment system can be replicated in other situations. This can help rebuild community networks which is crucial in post-conflict situations.	Implementing NGOs
	b - Vulnerable People and Women	2b1 - Prioritization	Vulnerable people and women are positively impacted the most by SSSR projects and are often prioritized. This can include women with children, people with disabilities, elderly people, and others.	Literature and NO12, IO5, NO11	Prioritization of women and vulnerable people is a best practice which should be continued since they benefit the most from SR support. There is an increase in women-headed households due to conflicts which makes this even more important.	Implementing NGOs
		2b2 - Additional Resources	Extra attention is paid to women and vulnerable people by NGOs which includes more frequent monitoring visits and assistance with finding contractors and labourers.	Literature and NO12, IO5	Extra assistance for vulnerable people and women is a best practice which should be continued these people may require extra assistance to complete this work or to manage the completion of the work. Contractor-led SR should be considered in these cases since is easier for the homeowner to manage.	Implementing NGOs



Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
2 - Social	c - Permanence and Stability	2c1 - Desire of Homeowners	In post-conflict situations, homeowners do not always want to return home due to changes brought on by the conflict or due to psychological trauma associated with that place.	Literature and GG2	SR efforts must also be accompanied by other shelter modalities since SR is not appropriate in all cases, especially when homeowners may not want to return home for psychological reasons.	Implementing NGOs, IGOs, Donors
		2c2 - Homeowner Skills	Homeowners do not always have the skills to lead SR projects on their own or to carry these projects forward once the supporting NGO departs. This is especially true for women or vulnerable-headed households.	NO12	SR should include targeted capacity building training to help homeowners learn skills which will help them throughout the SR process and in the future. Examples of this have been construction training and contracting training.	Implementing NGOs
		2c3 - Further Research	There is a lack of research into SR projects in terms of their long-term benefits, specifically with regards to the social benefits which are harder to quantify. Sometimes this is used as reasoning to not conduct SR projects since they have not been proven.	All interviews	Organizations conducting SR projects should conduct their own follow ups and assessments on SR projects and there should be mechanism put in place to share this data. Some organizations already do this but keep this data internal to their organization. There should be more research in this field specifically to attempt to quantify the social benefits of SR projects.	Academics, Implementing NGOs, Shelter Cluster, IGOs
		2c4 - Young Men Engagement	Many young men often return from fighting and are left without employment. SR projects could contribute to the employment of these young men.	Literature, IW23	Organizations supporting SR should seek to employ young men where possible and potentially provide vocational training to improve their skills. One way this can be done is through negotiations with contractors so that they will employ a certain number of young men or IDPs.	Implementing NGOs
	d - Equity of Aid	2d1 - Beneficiary Screening	Vulnerability screening criteria do generally work to ensure the most at-risk people receive SR aid first. This only works in the cases that these beneficiaries meet the other criteria such as right amount of damage, proper HLP documentation, located in the target location of the NGO, and others. These screening criteria exclude many homeowners who might actually be the most severely at risk.	Literature and NO12	Shelter programs must consider all the members of a community and seek to meet the needs of as many as possible with prioritization given to the most vulnerable. Strategies must be generated to accommodate those that do not meet the criteria of SR projects. One way to do this is through collaboration between NGOs who might specialize in different shelter response options.	Implementing NGOs, Shelter Cluster, IGOs

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
2 - Social	d - Equity of Aid	2d2 - Other Needs of Homeowners	Sometimes SR projects were not initiated since there were other more pressing needs of homeowners such as food, water, and health services and the perception was that homeowners would choose to spend money on these things prior to shelter.	Literature and GO1, NO20	SR cannot be done in isolation from other forms of aid. All actors involved should consider multisectoral approaches. Further research must be done regarding how cash is spent in these situations.	All
3 - Governance	a - Local Authorities	3a1 - Varying powers	Conflicts can result in various areas being under different forms of control such as opposition and government-controlled areas. Even within opposition-controlled areas, the entities of power can vary considerable from place to place.	Literature and IW23, NO12, GG2	Strategies must be developed to account for differences in power structures in different areas. SSSR programs may look different in these different areas. Cooperation with local authorities is necessary in order to implement SR projects.	All
		3a2 - NGO / Authority Cooperation	Cooperation with local authorities is key in implementing SSSR programs regardless of the type of governance. This means integrating authorities in the process throughout all phases. The cooperation is more formal government-controlled areas through MOUs or agreements whereas it tends to be more verbal and relationship-based in non-government-controlled areas.	IW23	Supporting organizations must actively engage with local authorities throughout the project cycle and must remain flexible in terms of the method of cooperation and agreement.	All
		3a3 - Issues with Approvals	Organizations working in government-controlled areas noted significant issues with regards to approvals for SSSR projects. Organizations were completely denied the ability to lead cash-to-homeowner type SSSR projects and of the contractor-led SSSR projects they implemented, these had significant approvals delays of up to 6 months.	IG15, GW4, IW23, GG2	In order to implement more SSSR projects, IGOs should advocate with governments and authorities to educate them on the benefits of these projects.	IGOs
	b - State Policies	3b1 - Bureaucracy	SSSR is easier in non-government-controlled areas since organizations do not have to deal with the normative and institutional barriers of government policy.	GG2	When conducting SSSR in government-controlled areas, it must be paired with capacity building of the government and there must be cooperation between NGOs and the ministries. SSSR in non-government-controlled areas could be easier due to less regulation but this places additional responsibility on NGOs to ensure they are building safely, checking HLP, and selecting beneficiaries appropriately.	All

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
3 - Governance	b - State Policies	3b2 - Acceptance of Aid	Many more NGOs are operating in the opposition areas than government areas (approximately 20 compared to 70)	NO12, GW4	In government-controlled areas where there are strict regulations regarding aid, government capacity building and support should be prioritized through collaborative efforts.	All
	c - Shelter Sector Perception of SR	3c1 - Definition of SR	SR is not a well-defined concept and many organizations had a different understanding of it. Contractor-led housing rehabilitations were only considered to be SSSR if the homeowner had a significant involvement in the decision-making process.	Literature and all interviews	International guidelines should better define SR and it should be defined in terms of levels of SSSR since one definition cannot capture the entire scope of projects.	All
		3c2 - Understanding of SR	The shelter sector tends to conceptualize SR around the idea that there are skilled workers (mostly men) who are able to do the work themselves. In reality, many of the men have left or been killed in the war and those that could benefit most from SR support are vulnerable people and women. In most cases, even when given cash directly, homeowners contract out the work to the local economy.	IO5	Post-conflict SSSR must include mechanisms for vulnerable people and women and be designed with the understanding that the work will not usually be done by the beneficiary themselves.	Academics, NGOs
	d - Capacity of Supporting Organization	3d1 - Organizational Knowledge	Organizational knowledge through previous SSSR experience was perceived to be important in facilitating SR projects in Syria for INGOs. For NNGOs, organizational knowledge in local construction techniques facilitated SR projects.	Literature and IW16, NO18, NO17, NO19, IW23	INGOs should find ways of sharing their experience in SR projects to assist each other in building on lessons learned. Cooperation between INGOs and NNGOs can fill gaps in knowledge that each organization requires.	All
		3d2 - Managing Dispersed Projects	A major barrier for some organizations was the difficulty in managing SR projects due to the dispersed nature of the houses and beneficiaries.	Literature and IO7, GO3, GO1, IO8	SR projects are much more difficult to manage than other shelter responses such as refugee camps. Refugee camps are often chosen due to the efficiency and ease of management for large INGOs. Organizations conducting SSSR must have robust logistical capabilities, strong coordination, and mobility. Smaller NGOs are perhaps better-positioned to support SR projects for these reasons.	All

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
3 - Governance	d - Capacity of Supporting Organization	3d3 - Competing Priorities	Many organizations working in the opposition-controlled areas cited competing priorities as a significant barrier towards SR projects. This is because of the nature of this conflict which resulted in many IDPs fleeing to the opposition-controlled areas to avoid the conflict. This resulted in emergency response largely taking priority over SSSR efforts. In government-controlled areas, however, this was not as much of a barrier since there are not as many IDPs present and there is not the same requirement for emergency support.	Literature and IG15, NO19, NO20, IO7, NO12, GO1, NO10, IW16	In situations where there are still active conflicts, there is more of a chance of aid organizations having to move back and forth from emergency to recovery response. SR projects must be flexible to adapt to these changes or have specific funding and resources earmarked for them in order for them to be successful despite the changing situation.	All
		3d4 - Control and Coordination	Contractor-led SR projects improved the control and coordination of these projects, especially for organizations working in cross-border aid.	Literature and NO12, GO1, IO8, NO10	Contractor-led projects are recommended when coordination and control are more difficult, especially in situations of managing projects remotely from across a border.	All
		3d5 - Organizational Policies	Organizational policies such as Build Back Better and GBV were, at times, overly restrictive due to not properly being contextualized to the post-conflict setting. The Build Back Better concept is born from natural disaster settings and is not always relevant in post-conflict scenarios where the houses may be designed adequately for natural-disaster risk. GBV measures were noted as being too restrictive and with improper assumptions being made about the prevalence of GBV issues.	NO12, GG2	Policies such as Build Back Better and GBV can be very important in post-conflict settings; however, they must be contextualized to the actual risk based on the area in question.	All
		3d6 - Risks	Organizations noted issues regarding the timeframe of SR projects. Due to the steps involved in SR including beneficiary selection, risk assessments, community engagement, and execution, the process can take up to one year. With the changing conflict situation, this creates a high risk of SR projects not finishing on time.	IW6, GO1, IO8, NO10	SR projects carry significant risks in post-conflict situations and this is something that must be weighed by implementing organizations.	All
		3d7 - Training	Some organizations have requested further training for their staff in supporting SR projects. Some organizations such as SARD, who specialize in SR projects, provide training to other shelter cluster organizations.	IO8, NO11	This best practice of local NGOs providing culturally and contextually appropriate training on SR can be replicated in other scenarios.	Shelter Cluster, Implementing NGOs

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
3 - Governance	d - Capacity of Supporting Organization	3d8 - Selection of SR Modality	Contractor-led projects were the most common type of modality used for shelter rehabilitations. In most cases, homeowners were very involved in the decision making process and, thus, this was considered SR. Contractor-led projects are more expensive due to contractor fees but easier to control for most NGOs and more efficient for smaller standardized repairs such as doors and windows. Beneficiary-led repairs are cheaper, provide more agency to the beneficiaries, and lead to higher levels of beneficiary satisfaction, but are more difficult to manage and control.	Literature and IO5, NO11, IO9, NO12	Contractor-led projects are recommended for use for IDP-inhabited houses and for vulnerable people whereas cash-to-homeowner projects are recommended for situations where homeowners are inhabiting their own home and can manage the project. Wherever possible, cash-to-homeowner projects should be chosen since these projects give most agency and decision-making power to the homeowners. Beneficiaries should have a voice in determining which modality is selected.	Implementing NGOs
	e - Aid vs Development	3e1 - Aid vs Development	Development organizations were observed to be only present in government-controlled areas. SR is commonly supported by aid organizations as it is seen as meeting the immediate needs of the affected people; however, as it affects urban planning, it becomes a development issue as well. There is often a lack of coordination between these two sectors in terms of SSSR.	GG2	There must be more coordination between the aid and development sectors since both are active in government-controlled reconstruction efforts and SSSR work can be argued to fall into both categories.	Aid and development orgs
	f - Capacity of Government	3f1 - Capacity of Government	The capacity of the government is greatly reduced throughout conflicts and its ability to control state-led reconstruction and SR support is greatly diminished. Governments still desire to control the reconstruction process, however, which means that the process will be slow.	Literature and IO24	International NGOs and IGOs should enable the government through capacity building and must collaborate with the government on any SSSR initiatives within government-controlled areas.	Implementing NGOs, IGOs
		3f2 - Lack of Institutions	Due to the conflict, it was noted that in the opposition areas, there is no engineering inspection authority to supervise constructions. This prevents any structural work to be done to repair homes.	Literature and IO24	Private-sector involvement could be beneficial to solve this issue of a lack of engineering support to supervise repairs. Although this is a function the government should be responsible for, an engineering firm could team with an aid NGO to fill this gap as is done with other gaps that are filled by NGOs in these circumstances.	Engineering firms

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
3 - Governance	g - International Coordination	3g1 - Intersectoral Approaches	Intersectoral approaches must be implemented due to the nature of SR projects which require integration with WASH, health, transportation, and other sectors. One organization noted the need for low-level intersectoral coordination bodies such as task forces or committees to accomplish this.	GG2, GW4	Intersectoral coordination mechanisms must be in place at various levels to ensure SSSR efforts are enabled and sustainable. This should include low-level committees or task forces for intersectoral coordination.	Shelter Cluster, Implementing NGOs, IGOs
		3g2 - Shelter Cluster Guidelines	Shelter Cluster guidelines for rehabilitation and HLP were overall perceived as facilitating SR projects in Syria. Some organizations thought the guidelines were too excluding in terms of the acceptable damage level of houses. It was also noted by multiple organizations that the costs included in the guidelines were too low for most SR projects which meant that organizations had to reduce the scope of SR projects to fit the cost guidelines. One organization noted that the costs were set this low so as to facilitate more transitional housing projects and to minimize SR projects. HLP guidelines were also perceived as being too restrictive and excluding too many individuals.	NO12, IO5, IO8, IO7, IW6, GO3	Shelter Cluster guidelines such as the rehabilitation and HLP guidelines clearly enabled many organizations to conduct SR projects. They should be updated though to reflect the true costs of SR projects. If the costs are set to encourage certain modalities of support, this should be made clear. It is also recommended that the damage scale be reconsidered to include more beneficiaries. In accordance with recommendations from implementing NGOs, it is also recommended that HLP guidelines be reconsidered so that more beneficiaries could be reached. A best practice to maintain is that cluster guidelines be reviewed by a local NGO to ensure they are contextualized properly.	Shelter Cluster, Implementing NGOs, IGOs
		3g3 - Additional Guidelines	Most organizations expressed interest in international guidelines on SR projects to help organizations plan these at the strategic level. Additionally, organizations requested guidelines on area-based approaches, urban vs rural SR, conflict vs natural disaster SR, repairing war-damaged buildings, and on long-term shelter cash modality strategies.	Literature and all interviews	International guidelines should be developed to help organizations form strategies for post-conflict SR projects. Specific focus should be placed on the differences between urban vs rural SR support. Guidelines should also be created for repairing war-damaged buildings and for long-term cash modality strategies to help organizations understand how to implement cash programs at a higher level.	Academics, IGOs

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
4 - Legal	4a - Tenure / HLP	4a1 - Lost Documentation	Many homeowners have lost their tenure documents due to the conflict. This makes HLP verification for SR projects very difficult. The Shelter Cluster HLP Due Diligence Guidelines (for opposition-controlled areas) do allow for some flexibility which involves <i>community verification</i> whereby the owner of the home is verified by neighbours and other members of the community. Some organizations still perceive that these restrictions are too excluding. In the government-controlled areas there is also a system of <i>alternative documentation</i> where tenure can be confirmed through a bill combined with community verification.	Literature and GO3, GG2, IO7, NO12	Policies such as Due Diligence guidelines for HLP and alternative documentation facilitate SR projects greatly. The more that these restrictions can be loosened, the more SR projects will be enabled; however, this increases risks of HLP rights violations and breaching humanitarian principles which could jeopardize future humanitarian aid actions. Specific programs for those without the ability to meet HLP requirements could be earmarked such as transitional housing options. Another potential solution is to create an impartial tenure claim review body to give IDPs a place to plead their cases regarding mistreatment according to UN Pinheiro Principles.	All
		4a2 - Registries	There were many challenges noted around tenure registries such as: pre-existing registry issues due to informal settlements which were not captured, registries being targeted and destroyed by ISIS during the conflict, illicit transactions reflected in the registry, and a lack of data management systems for registries. In the government-controlled areas, they are getting support from some NNGOs to help tackle this issue. The HLP verification process by the government takes up to 6 months which can cause significant delays.	Literature and GO3, GG2	Using NNGOs to help with registry has proven to be a successful solution to help the government, but this process is slow. As noted above, alternative forms of tenure verification can be used to rebuild these registries.	All
	4b - Leasing Contracts	4b1 - Leasing Contracts	One modality used in Syria is to exchange housing repairs for free rent for an IDP family for a certain period of time. This has caused issues when the homeowner changes their mind and evicts the IDP family. This modality, however, is a facilitator for SR projects in general as has been seen to work in most cases.	IO8, IO8, GO1, IO24	In post-conflict situations where there are considerable numbers of IDPs, repair-for-rent projects can be a good way to provide housing for IDPs while also helping to repair a homeowner's house.	Implementing NGOs, Donors

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
5 - Contextual	5a - Conflict and Security Situation	5a1 - Conflict Changes Over Time	The Syrian conflict has changed over its 9 year history including some factors which affect SR projects. Material availability was difficult in first few years but better in the past few years. HLP verification was also very difficult in early years of conflict but has since improved each year due to the loosening of policies. Rehabilitation projects (including SSSR) have become more relevant later in the conflict as other shelter options such as collective shelters have become full, housing stock has continued to be reduced, and people have started to return home.	Literature and GW4	SR programs are most difficult to implement early in conflicts and increase in relevance as conflict progresses over time. Funding, however, tends to decrease over the duration of a crisis which is something for the sector to consider.	All
		5a2 - Fluctuations in SR Programs	The changing conflict and rapid increases of IDPs has resulted in NGOs cancelling or suspending SR programs. Conversely, in other areas, it has also resulted in NGOs initiating SR programs since the demand for housing has greatly risen.	IW6, IO7, NO10	Funding for SR programs should be flexible to account for changing conditions on the ground and the potential temporary suspension of projects. SR programs must be adaptable and flexible to account for changes due to security situation and needs fluctuations.	Donors, NGOs, IGOs
		5a3 - Conflict (re)-emergence	Many organizations noted conflict risk as a barrier against conducting SR projects. This results in risks such as: the project not being completed, the project being completed but the house being damaged once again, and the project being completed but then turned over to enemy forces.	Literature and IW16, IG14, NO21, IW6, IO9, NO18, IO7, NO12, IW6, IO8	Whereas in natural disaster situations, the disaster event is generally short and once it passes it will not re-emerge (except for secondary earthquakes for example), post-conflict situations have significant risks of the re-emergence of conflict. Risk assessments are required before any SR project which reduces risk for the project but also slows projects down and excludes many other people in need. When the conflict risk is too high, organizations should consider other ways of supporting SR which are less risky such as the distribution of IEC materials.	All
	5b - Returnees	5b1 - Numbers of Returnees	It was noted that the amount of returnees has been growing as the conflict progresses.	Literature and GW4	SR gains relevance later in the stages of a conflict as more returnees arrive home.	All



Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
5 - Contextual	5b - Returnees	5b2 - Reasons for Return	There are various reasons for people returning including: the conflict situation becoming more stable, the lack of sufficient aid provided in camps, and the recent COVID-19 crisis.	Literature and GO3, IO5	Those implementing SR projects must consider other forms of aid occurring in the surrounding areas to understand how it might affect the demand for support for SR. SR is only possible when the situation allows for people to return home and begin rebuilding their lives.	All
	5c - Access of Aid Organizations	5c1 - Organizational Policies	Organizations have very different security policies. UN Agencies, for example, are not able to access Syria from Turkey due to security policies, whereas many of the other INGOs and NNGOs are able to.	GO1	Smaller organizations with more flexible security restrictions are better suited to conduct SR support in post-conflict settings. Larger IGOs are not well positioned to do so due to security restrictions.	All
		5c2 - Implementing Partners	In post-conflict situations, many SR projects are managed remotely with implementing partners who conduct the work on the ground. Some organizations do not allow this since they do not want implementing partners to be in a dangerous situation that they would not put themselves in. Although there are communication challenges with this, it does facilitate SR projects where they would not be possible otherwise. It also acts as capacity building for local NGOs.	GO1, IW6, IO8, NO12, IO5, GO1, NO10, IO24	Implementing partners are a good option for facilitating SR projects where there are access issues due to the security situation; however, it depends on the organization's ethical policies regarding this.	All
		5c3 - Cross-border Aid	In Syria, aid organizations work from neighbouring countries to provide aid to areas that are difficult to reach, specifically in the opposition-controlled areas. Many organizations noted this as a significant barrier as it requires significant monitoring and controlling. Permits to cross from Turkey into Syria are also a barrier due to the long processing time for these. To facilitate SR projects in these situations, organizations used strategies such as remotely managing the projects while using local professionals from within Syria and new monitoring and controlling technology such as an android application for rehabilitation projects.	NO20, NO21, NO12, IO5, IO8, NO10, IO24	SR projects are still able to be conducted remotely from neighbouring countries but this requires aid-accepting policies from the neighbouring countries and innovative methods to monitor and control these projects on the ground, such as phone applications. The availability of Wi-Fi in post-conflict countries must be considered, as this will further challenge project control.	All

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
6 - Technical	6a - Building Codes	6a1 - Building Codes	Different building codes are followed by different NGOs and actors constructing and repairing shelters. Syrian building codes were not often followed.	Literature and IO7	The shelter cluster should attempt to standardize building codes for NGOs to follow to ensure a standardizes and equitable response. Where possible, local building codes should be followed and improved as required.	Shelter Cluster, NGOs, IGOs
	6b - Type of Damage	6b1 - Damage Classification	Various organizations have differing scales for damage classification. Some are based on three colors and some based on levels 1-5, etc.	Literature and GG13, NO12, GW4, GO3, IW6	International guidelines should standardize damage scales for post conflict situations for ease of use and information sharing.	Shelter Cluster, IGOs
		6b2 - Lack of Expertise in War-Damage	A large barrier that was noted was the lack of understanding, technical expertise, and technical guides and manuals for war-damaged buildings.	Literature and IW16, NO18, NO17, NO19, NO20, NO12	There is a lot of research regarding the effect of natural disasters on structures but not a lot of (public) research regarding how bombs and munitions affect structures, much less how to repair these structures. Further research is required here and technical manuals should be distributed to aid organizations to help them understand this damage. Private sector involvement is key to accomplish this. IEC materials could also be developed to help homeowners themselves to understand how this damage can be repaired.	Academics, Implementing NGOs
		6b3 - Looting	Looting was noted as a major cause of damage within homes. This occurs after the home has been left empty due to people fleeing at which time looters come and tear apart the house for items such as copper wire which can be sold.	IO5	Looting creates a further challenge to SR projects and should be considered by implementing NGOs. The SSSR process should be initiated as soon as possible to avoid houses sitting empty and vulnerable to looting.	Implementing NGOs

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
6 - Technical	6b - Type of Damage	6b4 - Structural Damage	One of the greatest barriers to SSSR was the lack of the ability to conduct structural repairs. This is not allowed by the Shelter Cluster since there are safety concerns with repairing structural damage and due to the perception of structural repairs being reconstruction work rather than humanitarian aid (which should be left to the government). Many organizations expressed the desire to have approvals for structural repairs. By not conducting structural repairs, often the most affected people are not given any aid. Some organizations, however, feel that structural repairs are not the place of NGOs and that the private sector should be involved here.	IO7, GW4, IO5, IW6, GO1, IO9, IO24	NGOs could potentially provide the most benefit in structural repairs due to their resources and staff. Often, the light repairs that are conducted by aid organizations could, in fact, be done by homeowners themselves with simply financial support. To do this, there must be further research regarding the effects of war munitions on buildings which would facilitate appropriate risk assessments. Also, leniency is required regarding the perception of reconstruction work. Risk trade-offs must be reviewed to ensure they are appropriate and risk mitigation measures should be emplaced to reduce this risk. There is room here for private sector engagement from engineering firms who work in international development and have the most expertise in this area. IEC materials and technical manuals would help further facilitate this work.	Donors, IGOs, Shelter Cluster
	6c - Infrastructure Systems	6c1 - Infrastructure Systems	Repairing and rebuilding infrastructure systems such as roads, water systems, electricity, and sewage is integral to SR projects. According to SARD, "You can repair your house, but the whole street is blocked by debris – the infrastructure is not there."	Literature and GG2, IO8, NO11, IW23, NO12, GW4	Infrastructure repair and reconstruction must be done in conjunction with, or as part of SR projects. One method to accomplish this is through area-based approaches where an organization is placed in charge of coordinating an entire area rather than just one sector within that area.	All
	6d - Supporting Organization's Technical Competency	6d1 - Professionals on Staff	NGOs doing SSSR often have many professionals on staff such as engineers and architects which can greatly facilitate SSSR work. Those that do not have these staff in some cases claimed this was a barrier to SR projects. Most SR projects being done though are low levels of damage and repairs are mostly doors, windows, and other small fixes which do not necessarily require engineers.	Literature and IG15, NO1, IO8, IO9, NO12, IW16, NO18, NO17, NO19, IW6, NO11	Although engineers are not required for such cosmetic repairs, they are still important to have present for the damage assessments to ensure there are no structural safety issues. Therefore, each organization conducting SSSR work should have some engineers on staff or partner to support them with this. Those organizations that do have many engineers and architects on staff should consider using their expertise on more challenging repairs.	All

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
6 - Technical	6d - Supporting Organization's Technical Competency	6d2 - Quality Control	Some organizations noted difficulties in controlling quality as a barrier to SR projects due to the complexities of managing projects remotely. Facilitators to this include the signing of contracts between all parties to ensure quality standards are agreed upon, project completion inspections, and third-party quality audits.	GO3, GO1, NO12, IO8	In post-conflict situations where SSSR is often managed remotely, quality control mechanisms such as thorough contracts, project completion inspections, and third-party quality audits can be used.	All
	6e - Housing Typology	6e1 - Housing Typology	NGOs conduct SSSR on a variety of types of houses from detached rural houses to urban apartment buildings. The reason this is possible is because repairs are cosmetic in nature and not structural. If structural repairs were allowed, this would be much more complicated.	NO12	SR projects are still relevant even in urban contexts and with varying typologies of housing. Engineers must be on site, however, to ensure there are no structural damages are present elsewhere in the building which could cause safety issues.	NGOs, INGOs, IGOs
	6f - Other Shelter Response Modalities	6f1 - Other Shelter Response Modalities	In Syria, after 9 years of war, many are still living in tents as refugee camps are the main response within the opposition-controlled areas. Due to restrictions around building permanent housing, tents are the only option and the severe winters make this very difficult for IDPs. It was noted that approvals are not being granted to implement proper transitional housing solutions. Some organizations are subverting these approvals by constructing concrete slabs and brick walls but leaving the roof plastic to ensure it isn't perceived as permanent. They are also using plastic sheeting as partition walls in collective centres for the same reason.	Literature and IO8, IO24	In cases of prolonged conflict, the Shelter Cluster should advocate for more transitional housing options to avoid people living in tents so long. Transitional housing allows for IDPs, who are not yet able to return home, to have adequate housing for a few years while they wait to return home. They are designed to not be permanent, thus avoiding use for longer than intended. One successful example of this is earth houses which only last 3-5 years and after that they erode back into the ground. Collective centres can also be used. Donors should loosen restrictions regarding what is considered a permanent intervention to avoid NGOs compromising quality just to ensure the intervention is not perceived as being permanent. These nuances in perception of what a permanent structure is are subjective and sometimes nonsensical and have a real negative affect on IDPs.	UNHCR, Shelter Cluster

Level	Topic	ID	Author's Observations and Recommendations from Participants	Reference Data	Author's Recommendations	Stakeholders Concerned
6 - Technical	6f - Other Shelter Response Modalities	6f2 - SR Housing Stock	It was noted that there are limits to how much SSSR can be done, especially in situations where there are large amounts of IDPs and the amount of land is rapidly decreasing, such as in the opposition-controlled areas of Northwest Syria. In these cases, there are decreasing stocks of houses to repair and rehabilitate and IDPs need other solutions such as transitional housing. Unfinished housing from before the conflict was a facilitator for SSSR since it provided more potential housing stock for rehabilitation.	Literature and IO24	There are limitations to SSSR and one of them is that there must be enough housing stock and homeowners present to facilitate this approach. In post-conflict situations where many IDPs still cannot return home and there are not enough houses to repair, other temporary solutions such as transitional housing must be considered. Unfinished home constructions from prior to the conflict have been rehabilitated successfully which increases the amount of potential SR housing stock.	Shelter Cluster, IGOs, Implementing NGOs, Donors
	6g – IEC Materials	6g1 - IEC Materials	IEC materials such as easy instructions on how to repair certain damages or what materials to buy have been proven to be successful in facilitating the SR process and can be widely distributed. There is a limitation to IEC materials, though, and there are significant barriers to these being possible for structural repairs.	NO11, IO24	IEC materials should be shared among NGOs and easily accessible via an online database for wide use. IEC materials could also be developed to assist those that do not qualify for direct support from organizations and, since they are cheap to create and distribute, could reach a wide audience. There is a limitation to IEC materials, though, and there are significant barriers to these being used for structural repairs.	All
	6h - Building Safety	6h1 - Building Safety	There is a risk of houses containing UXOs which does act as a barrier against NGOs supporting SR projects.	Literature and IW16	UXOs require specialist support to remove. Implementing organizations must collaborate with local authorities in order to facilitate this.	Implementing NGOs
	6i - Availability of Labour	6i1 - Availability of Labour	Some organizations noted that superior skills of homeowners in vernacular construction methods greatly facilitated SR projects.	Literature and IW16, NO17, NO19	The skills of homeowners in construction is the basis of the entire SR concept. Although this still has relevance in post-conflict situations, it is less so than in post-natural disasters since many of the men, who traditionally do the work, have been killed or are still fighting.	All

## Annex G: Stakeholder Analysis

A stakeholder analysis was conducted by combining data from the literature review and the case study. Figures G2 and G3 show the final stakeholder analysis map produced for the government and opposition-controlled areas, respectively. These have been separated to highlight the differences in stakeholder power, interest, and attitude in these two areas of governance.




Figure G1: Stakeholder analysis for government-controlled areas.




Figure G2: Stakeholder analysis for opposition-controlled areas.

It is worth drawing attention to the fact that the government has an immense amount of control and higher interest in the government-controlled areas compared to opposition areas. Also, most stakeholders are supportive of self-recovery methods except for the government and some donors. The most supportive stakeholders, however, tend to have the least amount of power in both governance areas. These stakeholders are mainly the homeowners and communities themselves. This information was developed based on literature and on the perceptions of the participants based on their experience.